SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF: GENERAL WILLIAM J. WALKER

Thursday, April 21, 2022

Washington, D.C.

The interview in the above matter was held in Room 5480, O'Neill House Office Building, commencing at 2:36 p.m.
Appearances:

For the SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL:

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For GENERAL WILLIAM J. WALKER:

CONRAD RISHER
We'll go on the record.

This is an interview of William Walker, conducted by the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol pursuant to House Resolution 503.

General Walker, could you please state your full name and spell your last name for the record?


I'd like to ask everyone in the room today to introduce themselves for the record. I'll begin with my colleagues.

investigative counsel. How are you, sir?

General Walker. Great.

Hi, General Walker. I'm the chief investigative counsel. Good to see you again.

General Walker. Good seeing you.

senior investigative counsel.

Good seeing you, ma'am.

Good to see you.

I'm a professional staff member.

Great seeing you.

All right.

And if we could also have on your end. If you could introduce yourself, sir.

Mr. Risher. Conrad Risher. I'm the senior advisor to the Sergeant at Arms.

Great.

On the call with us is also members of the select committee staff members,
This will be a staff-led interview, and members of course may choose to also ask questions if any of them join the call.

My name is [REDACTED] and I'm an investigative counsel for the select committee.

Before we begin, I'd like to describe a few ground rules. They're the same as the previous transcribed interview, but I'll just repeat them now.

There is an official reporter transcribing the record of this interview. Please wait until each question is completed before you begin your response, and we will try to wait until your response is complete before we ask our next question. The stenographer cannot record nonverbal responses, such as shaking your head, so it is important that you answer each question with an audible, verbal response.

We ask that you provide complete answers based on your best recollection. If the question is not clear, please ask for clarification. If you do not know the answer, please simply say so.

I also want to remind you that it is unlawful to deliberately provide false information to Congress.

And you will have an opportunity, of course, to review the transcript once it is prepared.

So this is a short followup from our first interview. We have heard from what is essentially the full complement of witnesses as it relates to the deployment of the D.C. National Guard, both numerous leaders within the D.C. Guard itself and you've pointed us very helpfully to a number of names who we have interviewed at this point, both informally and transcribed, but also law enforcement partners and officials within the Department of Defense, all the way up through to the former Acting Secretary of
Defense. And we just wanted ensure you had a full opportunity to address and respond
to their comments.

So today we'll be, you know, walking through the events, the same way we did the
first one, you know, leading up to and through January 6th in detail. We'll hop around,
and I'll still try to do so chronologically, but focusing on some places where we were
interested in either some more detail or things that you might actually appreciate having,
sort of, your say in the conversation that we've sort of developed between the two sides.

So let's begin.

EXAMINATION

BY

Q. I wanted to ask you about the meeting with Mayor Bowser over the
summer, on Saturday, May 30th, after you and Secretary McCarthy met up at the Armory.

You told us how you had moved up the drill date to that weekend, and your
servicemembers were aggressing one another and rehearsing, and that you two spoke
about meeting up with Mayor Bowser at City Hall. And the way you described Secretary
McCarthy telling you was, quote, "We're going to see the Mayor, offer our services."

So let's talk about that meeting, if you can.

Had she, if you recall, invited you to come, or was this the Secretary proactively
scheduling a meeting with her?

A. It's the latter. It's the Secretary proactively scheduling a meeting.

The night before, the Secretary matter-of-factly told me, "We're going to go see
the Mayor, and we're going to convince her the National Guard needs to be out there."

Very, very proactive.

That night, I talked to General McConville, General Milley, and the Secretary
repeatedly. He asked for the Mayor's number. I called the Mayor and asked the
Mayor, can I give the Secretary of the Army her cellular phone number? She agreed. I gave it to the Secretary.

The Secretary called her, called me back -- am I going too fast? -- called me back and said, "I'm going to see you tomorrow morning. I want to see what your plan -- what you're doing."

And when he got there -- and I have photos of all this -- D.C. guardsmen rehearsing a foundational mission. And that civil disturbance, civil unrest, civil disorder is foundational to the National Guard. So we were rehearsing that. We broke out all the equipment just in case, photographed it. He saw it. And then he spoke to us.

And then we went to see the Mayor.

Q So you had given her the heads-up the night before that you were going to give at least the phone number to Secretary McCarthy. Did she know you two were going to visit her in person the next day?

A He called her. Then he called me and said, "We're good to go. We're going to go visit her."

Q Okay.

A So I asked her, can I share her number with the Secretary of the Army, and the Mayor said yes. I then gave the Secretary of Army, "Here's her number."

Q Okay. So they two set up the meeting --

A They spoke, and then the next morning we went to City Hall.

Q And you used the word "convince." You said that we're going to go and convince her to --

A Yeah, yeah, he felt strongly about it. He felt that the National Guard had to be out there. I mean, there was no -- so there's witnesses to this conversation. You know, I kind of -- I try to have lawyers with me, you know? I learned that a long time
ago. They can help you.

So there were witnesses to this conversation in City Hall, and if you need the list of
names -- so Colonel Matthews was there. I try not to go anywhere without him. The
chief of police; at that time, it was Chief Peter Newsham. The Secretary of Homeland
Security was there. Dr. Christopher Rodriguez was there. Command Sergeant Major
Michael Brooks, I don't go anywhere without him. And there were others.

But actually in the Mayor's private office, that's who was there in that private
office. Other members of the District of Columbia National Guard were outside.

Q And Secretary McCarthy talks about -- with us he did -- that meeting and said
that he told her, quote, "It looks like the crowds are getting much larger."

Can you give us, to the best of your recollection, basically a rundown of that
meeting? What did Secretary McCarthy say? How did the Mayor respond?

It's my understanding that on that day she didn't request assistance from the
Guard. I know the next day, that Sunday, you had told us that Dr. Christopher Rodriguez
gave you a call asking for help with civil disturbance.

Secretary McCarthy said that he also received a call back from the Mayor asking
for assistance with the traffic. And I know that -- but on that Saturday she didn't take up
the offer.

Can you just give us how that meeting went? What was talked, and what was
her disposition about the fact that he had come to try to convince her to call in the
Guard?

A Sure.

So the Mayor said that -- and it's true -- the Metropolitan Police Department is
probably one the most practiced police departments in the Nation with civil disturbance.

They're huge on First Amendment rights. So this is -- I don't know anybody that is that
open about having people permitted to share their grievances. Given the experience of
the Metropolitan Police Department, she was certain that they could handle it.

And then the crowd just grew and grew and grew.

Q  Okay.

Tell me a little bit about Secretary McCarthy. How was --

A  He was adamant that you need -- you know, this an elected official, so he
can only go so far. But he was very -- he tried to be convincing to her that the National
Guard is ready, we're prepared. He saw what we were doing, and he offered our
assistance proactively. He really wanted us out there.

Q  Did you, you know, have a position, General Walker? Did you say anything
in the meeting, or were you --

A  I said, "We need to be out there." I felt strongly that -- I mean, I moved the
drill. I had one guardsman drive 17-1/2 hours. So I gave -- it was a
deployment order -- it was a mobilization order. So you have to come. I don't care
where you are; you have to get to the Armory at all deliberate speed.

So I certainly felt -- I'm the kind of guy, I am going to err on the side of caution
always. Always. So, if I think I need a platoon, I'm going to bring two platoons.

Q  So did you also communicate your, sort of, view to the Mayor as well, that
you thought it would be --

A  I spoke to her the night before.

Q  Okay.

A  Yeah. But she is an elected official, and she told me, "We have this." I
said, "Yes, ma'am. Yes, Your Honor."

Q  And I know a lot of that was, you know, the night before you were watching
television and you saw the sort of walk down (ph) at the White House, you saw what was
going on on the streets, and that was sort of what spurred you and Secretary McCarthy to
talk.

A  That's what spurred me to act. So, when the Secretary of the Army called
me, I already told him what I had done. Under my own authority, which I had at one
time, I mobilized the entire District of Columbia National Guard, a mobilization order, put
that out on Webex, "Get here."

Q  And did Secretary McCarthy --

A  And I moved the drill from -- you know, I moved it a whole week earlier.

Q  And did Secretary McCarthy explain to you why he sort of shared your view
that, you know, this is a moment ripe for National Guard involvement? What was he
seeing? Or was he telling you why he thought it was also a good idea?

A  He was seeing civil unrest in other parts of the United States, as was I. I
mean, George Floyd had been murdered, and, you know, people were voicing their
displeasure in that event.

So my law enforcement experience told me -- and I'm a career intelligence
officer -- said, "Now, this is likely to happen. Be ready." So that's my position, was to
be ready for any eventuality.

Q  And by the next day is when the Mayor, I guess, comes to see it the same
way and realizes that she would like some assistance from the D.C. National Guard.

A  The following day, uh-huh.

Q  Okay.

You mentioned that, you know, the numbers were just getting larger. Do you
recall if she or -- I know you were on the phone with Dr. Rodriguez -- explicitly said what it
was that changed their minds?

A  The crowd size. I mean, it was just -- it was getting out of control.
Q. What do you think about the parallels between the summer, right, where we had the Secretary of the Army proactively seeking to try to get the city help from the National Guard, versus, you know, the lead-up to January 6th -- and we'll get into, of course, the reasons, but -- where there obviously was documented, in the lead-up, hesitance to get the National Guard involved?

What do you think about that? And what do you think about, you know, the idea that electoral considerations is what made January 6th different?

A. So I personally, William Joseph Walker, not General Walker, thought that it was just vastly different. Everything about the summer of 2020 and January of -- the summer of 2020, November of 2020, December of 2020. National Guard is not called in December. National Guard is not called in November. And I watched on television the difference between people coming to the Capitol in November. And if you watch the film, and if these same groups came back in December, better prepare. Better prepare.

So, in my mind, January 6th was not an intelligence failure; it was a failure to appreciate what people were being asked to do and appreciate that they were going to do it, they were going to respond to the call. And they did.

The Mayor clearly saw the same thing. December 31st, I get a letter from her, I get a letter from Dr. Rodriguez -- a phone call from Dr. Rodriguez. "We need guardsmen to man traffic control points and Metro stations. We're going to need all the policemen to do police things. We don't want you to be armed. We want you to be prepared."

"Got it."

I send that request to the Secretary of the Army, along with mission analysis. "This is what I think we're going to need to get that done." Tremendous resistance.

I mean, New Year's Day, the 2nd, 3rd, we were back and forth with the Army about how close a guardsman in uniform could be to the Capitol. Explicit direction:
No guardsmen can be at this street, no guardsmen can be at that street, I don't want any guardsmen near the Capitol.

Q    And so we'll get into those restrictions. Let me stick with the summer just --

A    Sure.

Q    -- for a moment.

So both you and Secretary McCarthy, you know, talked about how side-by-side you were over the course of the summer.

A    I can show you photos.

Q    Right.

A    And he's right next to me.

Q    He agreed. And so -- and how different January 6th obviously felt --

A    And he agreed. He agreed he was right next to me. You have the photos.

Q    Yes, sir -- and how different January 6th felt in that respect.

And I want you to give a reaction to how Secretary McCarthy explained the difference in terms of why you weren't physically able or maybe communicatively able to be side-by-side on January 6th.

He says, quote, "In the summer, it was kind of a build to the weekend, and my frequency of discussions and how much time I spent with General Walker went from, you know, once a day to hours a day, and then, ultimately, you know, we're -- a couple times a day, we're sitting side-by-side." But January 6th was, quote, "very different. I mean, one transpired over days. January 6th happened within minutes and hours," quote/unquote.

What's your view as to your thoughts on that and how -- it appears he's saying that the situation dictated that you, General Walker, and Secretary McCarthy couldn't be
side-by-side on the day of January 6th because everything was happening so last-minute.

What's your thought process on that?

A  This was my thought: The citadel of democracy, the beacon of freedom for
the whole world, is being attacked. What else could be going on? Why couldn't you
call me, have me come to you, or you come to me, or, better yet, we both go to the
Capitol? So, you know, where is he? Who could he be with?

What I was told -- what I was told is, he's looking for the Secretary of Defense, he's
looking for the Secretary of Defense. It's a big building. But here's the deal. The
Secretary of the Army has a protection detail. The Secretary of Defense has a protection
detail. They both have phones. Where could you be?

So I don't think he was trying to get in touch with me.

Q  And I want to run through the -- when we get to January 6th, I will run
through, sort of, the day's events and whether, you know, you're reaching out to
Secretary McCarthy or he's reaching out to you.

Did you have the ability to try -- did you try to call Secretary McCarthy?

A  I did.

Q  Okay.

A  So the phone that I had -- the number I had is no longer a working number.

So now -- and I was directed to go through Lieutenant General Piatt. If I wanted to
speak to the Secretary, I had to go through Lieutenant General Walter Piatt.

Who do I work for? The Secretary of the Army. Lieutenant General Piatt is not
in my chain of command. I work directly for -- I worked directly for the Secretary.
Actually, I worked for the President, through the Secretary of Defense, through the
Secretary of the Army. Two executive orders makes that clear.

Q  So let me ask you, then: Is January 6th the first time you realized that the
phone number that you had for Secretary McCarthy was out of service?

A Yes.

Q And so, when you called it -- particular question, but -- did you hear ring
tones? Or is that --

A "This phone is out of service." So then I was told to go through General
Platt.

And, actually, that had started around November, December. I could still reach
him, but he would tell me, go through Platt, go through Lieutenant General Platt.

So, for example, in December, when there were skirmishes in the city, and I'm
watching it -- I have Major Ford, Major Ford, who's a Metropolitan Police lieutenant and
also a District of Columbia guardsman -- I told him to go to police headquarters and take
two other policemen that are also guardsmen to MPD headquarters, monitor the
situation, report to me, so we're not late to need if the District of Columbia needs our
support.

I had people that are with the White House -- White House Secret Service. I had
those people with the White House tell me what's going on.

I had FBI agents that are guardsmen at FBI watching the field office, what's
happening, so I could call the Secretary.

I called the Secretary. We talked very briefly. He said, run everything through
General Platt. So I had to -- so now I'm feeling this go-between between me and the
Secretary all of a sudden when it comes to civil unrest in December.

Q I want to talk a little bit about when you came to find out -- the Secretary
had drawn a number of lessons from the summer. And there's some, you know, debate
and discussion as to whether they were either proper lessons, whether they were
founded, but I kind of just want to talk about when it became clear to you.
So let me quote the Secretary. He told us, "What we learned in the process was, we were not capturing a lot of the information in writing in the orders process, which is fundamental, foundational. Because of the stress of the situation and the speed of the situation, there was tremendous pressure to get things settled, you know? There was -- you know, you can tell, there was a lot of almost anxiety in the way the decisionmaking was going. Faster, faster, faster. And, you know, we have an expression in the Army: Slow is smooth, and smooth is fast. Get it right. And so that was one of the things we learned, you know? When you're doing things very quickly, you can get things lost in translation. You've got to put things in writing so you're very clear about their roles and mission and their authorities."

And so Secretary McCarthy tells us that he told his staff, quote -- this was after the summer -- "When we get a request next time, we have to be absolutely certain that we understand the mission clearly and that no other civil authority could remission off that support without the approval of either the Secretary of the Army or, in certain circumstances, the Secretary of Defense."

Putting aside the wisdom of that lesson that he learned, how much of this sort of conversion for Secretary McCarthy toward detailed, written-out CONOPS that were done at the Secretary level -- when did you become aware of that? When did you become aware of that, that that was important to him? Did you know from the summer that he started to feel this way? Or was it surprise to you, leading up to the days of January 6th?

A I honestly can't tell you how he felt. I know I did a complete after-action report and sent it to him; never heard anything about it. And I talked about how the summer could've been better.

But here's what happened after the summer. July Fourth, we were out there,
District of Columbia National Guard, supporting the city. The -- I want to say the 57th anniversary of the March on Washington in August, the District of Columbia National Guard was out there.

Who came to the Armory? Dr. Wardynski, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; his deputy, Assistant Secretary Williams, was there; and others. And they watched how we planned and supported Metro stations, traffic control points throughout the city. We had a base of operations at the United States Park Police headquarters. Dr. Wardynski came there. Assistant Secretary Marshall Williams came there. They were there. The Army leadership was there, out there with us.

So you had the July Fourth; you had the March on Washington in August. So I didn't -- if this change occurred, it occurred sometime between August and January.

Here's what I can also tell you, though. I called and said, "Hey, Mr. Secretary, do you think we should have people in the Armory on standby in case the city needs our help?" "Absolutely not. No."

December: "Mr. Secretary, don't ever want to be late to need. Do you think we need somebody?" "No."

Both occasions, you could see on television the Metropolitan Police Department received assistance from the United States Park Police. And so we kind of -- you know, it worked out.

Q So I want to get back to that, but, briefly, that makes me think -- so, in the November and December MAGA 1 and MAGA 2 marches --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- you asked Secretary McCarthy, you proposed to him --

A Should we be --
Q    On standby.
A    -- on standby, you know.
Q    When he said no, did he give you an answer as to -- or a reason?  Excuse me.
A    No, he didn't.  He just said no.
Q    Okay.  So --
A    And I also called the Metropolitan Police Department, called the Park Police -- I called anybody that might need us.  Because the National Guard, it's fundamentally a part-time force.  We have several hundred guardsmen in that building, but the bulk of the Guard, they're your cooks, your bakers and candlestick makers, they're firemen, they're policemen.  They have other things to do.

So, you know, one of the lawyers, like I told you, he drove 17-1/2 hours.  Didn't recommend -- I didn't know where he was coming from.  I would've never asked him to do that.  But I did need him to be here, and he -- and they all came.

    And on that point, --

BY:

Q    General Walker, if you're a National Guardsman and you're a sworn officer with MPD and both agencies need you, which legally takes priority?
A    Who can get the orders first.
Q    Okay.
A    So I was pushing for these orders, and I had some policemen and Federal agents said, "Hey, I gotta go."  You know, they were here for the -- so I had people on orders for the COVID mission.
Q    Uh-huh.
A    I had people on orders for the mission to support the city.  But because we
weren't actively at the Capitol, I was told that, hey, this guy had to go or that guy had to go. So their police departments --

Q  Yeah.

A  -- and, you know, FBI, different -- they left.

Q  Okay.

A  Because they had to go. So who takes --

Q  Yes. Is there a statute that controls this? Like --

A  If you're on orders, if you're on, like, a Title 10 order --

Q  Right.

A  -- or a Title 32 order, you're on that order.

Q  You gotta stay.

A  You gotta stay.

Q  I see.

A  You've gotta stay in the military.

Q  But, before that, if you're a guardsman and you get the call but you've already been --

A  Then you go back.

Q  Then you go back to your --

A  And then it also depends, what do you do. Like, if you work in a hospital and you're a neurosurgeon and you're -- then go back and do that, you know.

Q  I see.

A  So we still have some leniency.

Q  Got it.

A  We have some flexibility, rather.

So, if he said, hey, you know, you're -- whatever you do in your civilian job and it's
absolutely mission-critical --

Q  You've gotta go.

A  -- to your city, county, State, then we'll -- I forget what we call it, but we take you off the order list.

Q  Yeah. And so the result of that is that your, sort of, footprint, your maximum numbers --

A  Could fluctuate.

Q  -- could fluctuate, given who is deployed in the mission --

A  Who's making the ask.

Q  Got it.

A  Who's asking.

Q  Okay. That's helpful.

BY:

Q  So, on the shift in the Secretary's mind in between the summer and January, I know it's difficult to read his mind, so I just want to ask if you recall a meeting in which there was discussion about the summer and the lessons learned from it.

So Secretary Esper, when we asked him, "Do you remember discussing that" -- sort of, the lessons learned from the summer -- "with General Milley, in terms of writing down what occurred over the summer and making sure it didn't happen again?"

And former Secretary Esper told us, he recalled, quote, "I don't recall physically writing a letter or a memo discussing these things, but there was a larger meeting. I think General Milley was there. I know Secretary McCarthy was there. I know General Walker was there, and others. And this was a week or two, like I said, sometime within the first 2 weeks, I want to say, of the two events of June 1st. And we discussed these things -- again, uniforms, shields, things like that."
A  Uh-huh.
Q  And then we asked if, "After the summer, was it your intent for the Secretary of the Army" -- this is Secretary Esper -- "or the Secretary of Defense to be more involved in the deployment of the D.C. National Guard?"

This is what he said. Quote, "Let me answer this in a few ways. I think given what happened the week of June 1st and some of the events that happened -- so we, for example, we were surprised that a helicopter was used on the evening of June 1st, and within an hour of being informed I immediately directed an investigation. We were later surprised that another National Guard aircraft was used and conducted another investigation.

"So I think there were a number of things that surprised us during the course of the week June 1st that prompted us to get more involved in these types of deployments. And so we took a more active -- I certainly did. I know Secretary McCarthy did.

"And I think the thing is, this was a unique event. It's fair to say protests and civil unrest like this probably hadn't happened in decades, a couple generations. And so we were no longer dealing with the normal requests that come through the system for additional National Guard support for July Fourth celebration, for National Guard traffic control support for a parade, or something like that. We were in a completely new situation now.

"And I think, as a result, we all took a more active interest in what was happening, down to the tactical level, to make sure that we were, again, abiding by kind of the core principles of civil-military relations, the military support to civil authorities."

So that's a lot, but first I want to ask, do you recall that meeting where he says you discussed this, sort of, after-action --

A  Yeah. I do.
So I was in that meeting. And Dr. Esper -- who I serve with in the District of Columbia National Guard, and I appreciate his service -- Dr. Esper said that what we needed, to be sure that a National Guard uniform -- or, a military uniform wasn't mistaken for people that were law enforcement.

So the District of Columbia National Guard received criticism for being heavy-handed with people. And The New York Times and others did a very, very good job. And they called me; they said, "General, we can't find any District of Columbia National Guardsmen putting their hands on people." And I sarcastically said, "Well, I sympathize with you," but not so much. I was thrilled that they didn't find one guardsmen abusing anyone. And I'd like to take credit for that, from the discipline, what I spoke to these soldiers and airmen about before we went out there, and, actually, even what the Secretary of the Army said to them.

So that there were no D.C. guardsmen found abusing anybody. These were police officers. And The New York Times did a great job. If you zero in on them, you could see they had military-like uniforms, but the D.C. Guard have the city's flag. I did that when I was a one-star. I had them purchased for everybody in the D.C. Army Guard. And once I became the two-star, I had them purchased for the entire National Guard. And those flags, those D.C. Guard -- can't miss them -- those red flags that represent the city, they're Velcro'ed to the uniform, and they all had them on. And there's no photos of any guardsmen abusing anyone.

So the meetings were more -- Dr. Esper wanted to find a way to have surplus uniforms not be given to Federal, State, local law enforcement that come out to deal with people, because it gives the perception that it's the United States military. So he was big on that.
[3:07 p.m.]

General Walker. Now, as far as the helicopters -- so Brigadier General Ken Ryan had the inherent authority as the task force commander to bring the aircraft. He had done it before. We were moving -- that aircraft was constantly in the air, bringing COVID supplies. That night, he tells me, Sir, I launched the helicopters, observe and report. The Secretary was standing right next to me at FBI headquarters. And I said, Mr. Secretary, helicopters are up to observe and report. He said, approved. I approve. And I didn't say anything to him. I was like, you don't have to prove that, General Ryan did it on his own. I was basically letting him know, but he says approved. And people heard him say that. And he actually testified that he approved the helicopters.

So when I saw that they were low, I ordered a 15-6 investigation conducted by the Army. The Secretary, later that day, said, no, it's my 15-6, and you have it done, General Walker, but I'm the customer, it's going to be my investigation. I want to say the next day, Dr. Esper took the investigation and it became his. So I still had -- I assigned two Air Force attorneys to do the investigation, Army helicopters, I wanted Air Force to look at it. And then the Army sent some people, and they found that it was safe. I don't know if you knew that.

BY [Redacted]:

Q Yes, I think we have you from the first transcript. We have you on the record in essence. I think this is a good quote from you, I think. You know, it's convenient for the Army to say, or for anybody to say, Oh, it was the summer, too heavy-handed. We weren't heavy-handed. Two pilots flew a little bit too low. So we did go through quite extensively. So I'm less interested in substance because I know your feelings on whether the National Guard was heavy-handed, whether be the
helicopter was such an event that really should explain the scapegoat in your mind as to
the delay that happened on January 6th.

  I want to get into, you know, did you understand the perception from those above
you that they were taking it as lessons learned, and how early that came about? I guess
what I want to figure out is, was the hesitancy that we saw in the lead-up to January 6th,
wasn't that in the making for six months? And what it could have been substantively
bad, which think is your position, but wasn't it in the making for 6 months?

  A     Well, it wasn't there in August. So if you want to say it was there, it wasn't
there in August. So, you know, that takes away the six months. I think it came on in
January.

BY_________________

  Q     Just on that point, General Walker, did you see a difference in the
deployment for July 4th crowd control that people come to D.C. to see fireworks, and the
August event, I think, was an anniversary event you mentioned --

  A     Uh-huh.

  Q     -- versus the commonality between the civil disturbance protest in June and
what was expected for January 6th as civil disturbance protests?

  A     Between the two -- these two events, just the celebration, July 4th, and then
a -- the August --

  Q     So just if the DOD leadership is concerned about the military's response to
civil disturbance protests, in my mind, the July event and August event are not civil
disturbance protests. Would you agree to that?

  A     I would agree. But when you say that they wanted to look over everything
we did any time we came out, I think you said anything that we respond to -- any requests
from the city.
Q: Well, I believe Secretary Esper nuanced it when it comes to civil disturbance protests. So do you see that?

A: Well, no, I don’t. I don’t. In my mind, they were just completely different. I did a very thorough after-action report on the summer. We even had the Center for Army Lessons Learned come from Fort Leavenworth to help us with it. We sent it to the Secretary and received no feedback from him.

Q: And I think that everyone would agree within DOD leadership that there was no actual fault found. However, there was a certain amount of criticism that DOD received because of, take away the helicopters, because of the June 1st event with General Milley and Secretary Esper walking to Lafayette Square.

A: Totally separate. There was not a -- I was out there.

Q: I under --

A: There's no D.C. -- so those were policemen in the military uniform when the Park Police, when they cleared that avenue of approach, there was no guardsmen there.

Q: Right. I understand that, but I am just wondering if DOD is responding to it as an enterprise in terms of the perception of those events?

A: I think not. DOD is General Milley, it's the Secretary of Defense, it's the Secretary of the Army, it's the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Vice. That is DOD. I mean, that's -- who else is there? And General McConville was out there. General McConville came to my office in the summer. I mean, they brought the commanding general of the military district of Washington. They brought the head of -- the two-star who ran -- I believe, CID was there. So they brought all of that to the Army. They actually, some could say, they were so involved that their very presence could have been misinterpreted by some of the guardsmen. And so some of the quotes by some of those leaders -- Washington is not going to burn on my watch. The White House won't be
breached. I mean, we didn't hear any of that in January.

Q    And I understand what you're saying. I think that, again, as Robin pointed out, we've interviewed a number of people on the DOD side, as well as many people on the D.C. National Guard. And I think as you have stated, you believe those guidelines that came out for January 6th came out for January 6th. But as part of the greater investigation, we've learned, they actually were born months earlier.

A    Is that written somewhere?

Q    I --

A    Did they give us any guidance?

Q    If I could finish my question.

A    Well, I was just trying to better understand.

Q    Sure. So we learned that it came out from the summer and was essentially discussed during Secretary Esper's time, which, as you know, ended in November. So our question is, knowing that, does that change your view -- it may not -- about those guidelines and restrictions you felt on January 6th?

A    It does not change what I know to have happened.

BY:********:

Q    Let me ask you about --

**?    Yes?

**    Can I just ask one quick clarifying question?

*    Sure.

**    Sir, you mentioned an organization, CID. Is that the Criminal Investigative Division?

General Walker. Yes. Yes.
I just wanted to make sure we had that for the record.

General Walker. And I'm not certain, but there was a two-star. I think he was CID. I think he was the -- but the military district of Washington, that two-star Army general was there as well. And there was talk about invoking the Insurrection Act. We were at FBI headquarters quite a bit. It's a very different response during the summer than it was on January 6th. And what I'm trying to say, respectfully, that if the Army thought different of how we respond to civil unrest, civil disturbance, I would hope, I would hope they would communicate that with the guy -- with the person who is going to execute that change.

BY [Redacted]:

Q And I think I'm understanding from your testimony that you were at that meeting, you understood that there were things they wanted to look into, and perhaps lessons that they felt they were going to draw. But that no one made it explicit, at least to you, that they were thinking that there needs to be sort of top-down level control, more secretarial input, more written down of CONOPS. Is that fair that that sort of wasn't expressed to you?

A Sir, what I can tell you is I don't know what more they can get. So what happens? A former request is prepared. Mission analysis is conducted. That mission analysis is a whole team that comes up with that. Here's what we are going to need, here is the equipment, here is how long we're going to need it, here is who is going to do it. Then that package goes first to General Counsel of the United States Army. It goes there. Is this legal? Does this meet all these different requirements? Is it good training? Can we afford to do it? Does it promote readiness? There's a whole list of things that they go through. Then it goes to the Army staff, and they look at it. And then they either concur -- so I either get, General Walker, you know, here are the -- you
can do it as planned or it's modified or it has some restrictions. But they look at it. So are they saying that they weren't looking at it well enough? We send them everything how we are going to do the mission. This is our mission analysis, and this is how we're going to do it. Have you seen anything like that? Have you -- can I show you -- send you when a request comes in?

Q We do have all that paperwork. And we've seen it and talked to you, to D.C. National Guard leaders as well about it. And so we understand all of that process that really went into certainly January 6th and all the time when the civil disturbance request comes in.

Let me ask you about the request from Park Police to assist in planned demonstrations in the days before and after the election November 1st to November 8th. It's my understanding that that was flat out rejected, and, in part, because of its proximity politics. And so you've talked a little bit about how the hesitance -- you did start seeing it in November and December. You asked Secretary McCarthy to see if we can even be on standby. The answer was no. I know we have this example of a flat-out rejection of a request for assistance.

So what do you say about that, the fact that this sort of commonality between November, December, and January 6th is that those civil disturbance events dealt with the transfer of power, the peaceful transfer of power dealt with politics, and that there were those considerations, concerns, not just within the Department of Defense, but from without of having military footprint on an event dealing with democracy? What's your thought process on that?

A So the District of Columbia National Guard Capitol guardians created by an act of Congress to protect the Capitol. I thought that's what we should have been. I mean if you look at a D.C. guardsmen, the shoulder insignia is the Capitol. I don't think
the President, Thomas Jefferson, was mistaken in 1802 when he wanted a National Guard militia to protect the Capitol.

Q  I would like to move now to the, sort of, 5 days of deliberation between December 31st and January 4th on approval for the Guard was ultimately given by Secretary Miller. And I want to actually start -- I want to talk to you about Secretary Miller, Acting Secretary Miller. He told us, quote, He heard through the grapevine that Secretary McCarthy was inclined -- I don’t want to say inclined to disapprove. But, you know, looking at it carefully whatever, but -- so that’s fine. He can do whatever he wants. I knew that I was going to honor the Mayor’s request.

So I kind of want to know if you had heard anything, either from Secretary Miller directly yourself, or had heard talk that even while Secretary McCarthy was having these sorts of 5 days of deliberation negotiation, as you put it, that he apparently always intended to approve the request from the Mayor. Had you heard anything from Acting Secretary Miller?

A  Well, no, so I can reach personal conclusions. So Secretary Miller was a D.C. guardsman. Were you aware of that?

Q  Yes, he told us that. Yes, he did.

A  He told you.

Q  Yes, he did.

A  Yeah, so he knows what the foundational mission of the District of Columbia National Guard is, protect the Capitol.

Q  And, you know, we’ll get to it a little bit for January 6th. Was it uncommon for you to have any direct communication with Acting Secretary Miller?

A  Yeah, I wouldn’t -- so I never talked to -- after Dr. Esper became the Secretary of Defense, I never spoke to him -- well, if I was in a meeting, he would come
over and say hi to me because we knew each other as National Guard officers.

Q    It sounds with former Secretary Esper you were more in direct

communication. Is that fair?

A    When he was Secretary of the Army, I could pick up the phone and call him, yes. And for a while --

Q    I see.

A    -- I can pick up the phone and call -- I'm sorry?

Q    When he was Secretary of the Army is when you --

A    Yeah, Secretary of the Army. When he was Secretary of Defense, oh, no, he's got the entire Department of Defense to worry about. I'm not going to bother him.

You know, and I was going through Secretary McCarthy, and everything was fine with Secretary McCarthy and I. It wasn't until after the election is when things, you know, it's hard to get to him, hard to reach him. It's just different.

Q    In the Secretary of Defense's guidance to the D.C. National Guard, changes in the mission of the Guard had to be approved by the Secretary of the Army. That's what he wrote. But in some cases, it included, quote, interact physically with protesters, or to be issued batons. It required running up further up the chain to the Secretary of Defense. Was that extra level up to the Secretary of Defense -- this is, of course, leading to January 6th, was that new to you, and did you think it was necessary?

A    Well, the Secretary of Defense, I mean, ultimately, that's who I worked for as well. But here, I mean, I had those batons. I had the riot equipment anyway. I mean, I'm going to protect people who are going to protect others. So I had all of that in the vehicles.

Q    And we are going to get to that, but since you brought it up -- so what did you think about that knowing that it had been expressly prohibited as not -- it wasn't to
be included as part of the repertoire tools available to the guardsmen.

A  Uh-huh.

Q  And you, obviously -- we've spoken to Lieutenant Colonel Hunter who told,
yes, that equipment, including the batons was included in the vehicles on January 6th.
Talk us through why knowing that that was forbidden, but D.C. National Guard went
ahead and did it anyway?

A  D.C. Guard didn't go ahead and do it, I did it.  I mean, I told him that you
are going to have to protect these people.  I'm not going to have them out there without
the ability to protect themselves.  So, in my mind, anything could happen.  And I
wanted them to get to those vehicles and put on protective equipment, helmets, have
the masks, have the shields, have everything ready.

Q  And just the spectrum of, you know, stepping out of the chain of command,
like we'll talk again a little bit about it, but on one end was deploying the troops, even
though you didn't have approval.  And I know you contemplated that seriously.  And
resigning (ph) the next day, you told us all about that incident.  And maybe on one end,
on another end a little less severe is, you know, stepping out of the chain of command in
terms of what equipment was available to them, which you did feel comfortable doing.
I guess could you compare those for me as to why one, you know, you obviously felt
comfortable and the other one was maybe a bridge too far for you?

A  So having the equipment out there, it was in the vehicles, they could get to it
if they needed it.  And I didn't want anything to happen to a soldier or an airman who
didn't have the ability to defend themselves and protect themselves.  So the shields, the
helmet -- and that's, you know, look at what happened in the summer.  Several soldiers
hit with bricks,concussions.  So I wasn't going to have my soldiers unprepared.  Now,
as far as just going out there and reporting to the Capitol anyway, which I seriously
contemplated and talked about out loud, every lawyer in the room told me, sir, you can’t
do that. You cannot do that.

Can I ask a follow-up question to that?

Sure.

General Walker, with respect to the order, in your mind, is there an
appreciable difference between -- let me back up. So when the order says these items
will not be issued to the guardsmen, in your mind, is there an appreciable difference
between them having them on them versus them being available. And if there is, is the
availability of them still in your mind in keeping with this theory of what the order said?

General Walker. Thank you. I should have said it with the grace
and specificity that you did. You drove by, you did not see any guardsmen on the traffic
control points, in the metro stations, at the top of the metro stops with helmets, riot
gear, shields. So they didn’t have it. But they could go to the vehicles and get it --

Q -- in case they needed it.

A In case they needed it.

BY:

Q But, General Walker, there was a discussion where they didn’t even allow
the body armor or helmets to be in the vehicles. You pushed back, and you told
Secretary McCarthy, Hey, for self-defense, we need these things in the vehicle --

A Uh-huh.

Q And you wanted a date on that?

A Yes.

Q So you did have that discussion. Why didn’t you also push back on the
batons and tell him, I also want to include batons? You did go to your superior and get
what you needed in terms of the body armor and the helmets. Why the batons, in
particular, why wasn't that brought up, or why was it included without a discussion with your superior?

A  I just had the batons in the vehicle.

Q  I want to talk about your conversation with Chief Sund. You told us this is the lead-up to January 6th. You told us, this is how you put it. Chief Sund told you that the Capitol Police Board didn't want to approve requesting the Guard in advance because of the optics, and he asked you instead to, quote, "Lean forward and have as many guardsmen available," end quote, in case of an emergency. So I do really want to through the conversation -- of the details of that conversation. So Chief Sund told us it occurred on Sunday, January 3rd, the day of the congressional swearing in in the evening. It's okay if you don't recall. I just want to see if you do.

A  No, we talked --

Q  Okay.

A  He's kind of a friend. So I spoke to him quite, quite frequently.

Q  Okay. And so he told us at least in that conversation that he had a short conversations that same day earlier with Paul Irving, House Sergeant at Arms, and Michael Stenger, Senate Sergeant at Arms. Do you remember -- it's hard because you're saying you talk to him a lot. Think about the conversation what he told you about the leaning forward. Do you recall if he told you that he had actually discussed the matter with the members of the Capitol Police Board?

A  Yes, he told me, and I'm pretty sure that's the right day.

Q  Okay.

A  But leaning forward, he used -- we talked about that on more than one occasion. And every time I was real clear, Chief, it's got to be in writing. It's got to be in writing so I can get it approved. You know, and he told me he wasn't going to be able
Q  So let's go through that conversation. Did he mention what the Capitol Police Board -- and you sort of said it, but what the Capitol Police Board told him?
A  He told me that he was not allowed to ask for the Guard. But -- and then he told me he told them, but I'll have them on standby, you know, leaning forward.
Q  Do you recall whether his position -- so when he talked to you, is he telling you, I really wanted the Guard, I pushed for the Guard in front of the Capitol Police Board, and they told me no. Or it was just a suggestion, or he was just sort of feeling you out?
What was his position on the Guard?
A  Yeah, so it was both. He did want the Guard to be ready. But at the same time -- and I just kept drilling him. He said, all days off had been canceled, all hands are on deck, we're ready. He kept telling me, we're ready. And that's faith and confidence in his police department. I later found out that all hands weren't on deck.
Q  Right.
A  Leave wasn't totally canceled. I mean, I started digging at that as soon as I got the job. But he thought that he had the entire Capitol Police at his disposal. And he told me that he was not allowed to formally request the District of Columbia National Guard.
Q  Can you tell me about his tone? It sounds as though it wasn't a tone of frustration, that the Capitol Board had somehow kept him from asking, he seemed to be in line with that thinking. Is that fair?
A  No, he was concerned, but at the same time -- it's hard to explain. I mean, knowing him, he wants to have confidence in his police department. Yeah, we got it. He kept saying, you know -- I don't know if that was just he was thinking positively. But at the same time, I can tell there was a little bit of nervousness. And then he switched
the conversation several times. I told my wife, I said, I just hung up with Steve Sund, and he's talking about getting his son into the Air Force Academy, and he wants to fly in the F-16. I said, I remember thinking, I would have one thing on my mind. I wouldn't be talking about flying. So then I said, Well, he must be very confident in those policemen. And my wife and I had that discussion. I hung up, and I was baffled by his predicament.

Q: It sounds, though, it certainly didn't seem as though he had had an argument with the Capitol Police Board over the involvement of the National Guard.

A: I didn't sense that there was an argument, I sensed that it was more -- and so right now I'm the chair of the police board. And it's not really any argument. I mean, it was -- if you're not doing this, it's not happening. But I'll tell you one good thing that has happened, the Chief of the Capitol Police now doesn't need the board to request National Guard support. And the board was, you know, very happy about that.

Q: Did he talk about whether -- anything about the Intelligence Agency and whether it would support requests for National Guard?

A: No, we didn't talk about -- and that's -- I don't know if that's even fair, because you don't need intelligence. I mean, everybody knew that people were directed to come there by the President. November was a run-up, December was practice, and January 6th was executed.

Q: Did he explain what he -- theoretically, you know, he told you to lean forward. When he would need these National Guard, if he had requested them earlier like not in the moment on the day, but ahead of time, what they would be doing, or what he needed them for if he needed them?

A: No, I mean, I think that's implied. It would be to help restore order. I don't think, you know, that was implied. If I need guardsmen is to do what guardsmen
do.

Q I guess I wanted to make clear that he didn’t feel a need at the time. So I know come January 6th, he is saying lean forward in case I need you. He is not calling you --

A No, before January 6th he is saying lean forward.

Q Right.

A January 3rd, 4th.

Q Right.

A January 2nd, 3rd, 4th, he's talking about leaning forward.

Q But he is not calling you to tell you that there is a current need. That's, in part, why he's saying --

A No.

Q -- we're doing all hands on deck.

A Yeah.

Q He is saying we don't need the National Guard right now, is how you interpret it?

A That's exactly how I interpreted it. We don't need the National Guard right now. But if we do, can you have some people ready? And I told him I would because I was going to remission the COVID people. And I had 400 soldiers on orders for COVID. These are part-time soldiers who I had on order to support the city with COVID operations. So stop, shift from COVID to the Capitol.

Q Let me get to the COVID part of the conversation. Last I want to ask, did he seem to agree with the optics characterization, or was he saying that that was coming from the Capitol Board?

A Right. He didn’t talk about optics, him personally. Steve Sund did not talk
about optics. He relayed what they told him about the optics.

Q And did he, at all, communicate to you an opinion whether he agreed with it?

A He did not. It was just steady. And they don't like the optics. Just like I said it now, they don't like the optics.

Q And so, what did you mean that you withdraw from the COVID servicemembers? So I think at our first meeting, you had said around 250. Chief Sund had used a figure of 125. I don't know if either of those sound right to you. But what did "lean forward" mean given that on January 6th would you still have had to have gone through the same channels, gotten the same approval from Secretary McCarthy, then Secretary Miller? Was there anything about these COVID servicemembers that either would have had them be deployed faster, or would the same sort of delay that we saw on January 6th have --

A No, sir. So in June, the first -- that response on that weekend I brought in the entire National Guard, but I already had soldiers on COVID missions. So that's how I was able to get so many people out on the street, because I already had people. So I was just going to take the people who were on COVID orders, it's a matter of priority. So you're helping the city with dealing with the COVID response freeze, get the helmets, get the batons, get all the equipment, go help the Capitol. I'm just going to remission. That was my plan to do that. That's what I intended to do if he called me.

Q It's just having another bucket available, right? So you obviously have the 340 out in D.C., but now you have an extra amount that you could on redeploy and remission?

A Yes.

Q Why -- you know, we have spoken to, you know, all of the folks at the D.C.
National Guard leadership that you told us to speak to. We have spoken to, obviously, all the Department of Defense officials. And everyone sort of agrees there's kind of three buckets. There's the, you know, 40 at the QRF; there's the 118 or so at the metro stations at the traffic control points; and then there's the second shift at the Armory gearing up to relieve those people. What happened with that COVID contingency? No one -- as far as I can understand, they weren't either redeployed or remissioned on January 6th.

A They were. They remissioned to help, you know, the COVID -- I mean, we didn't have -- by January 6th, the second mission came on -- the second team came on early. Pretty much, I didn't want any guardsmen in the Armory. I wanted everybody out there at the Capitol.

Q So they would have been folks who got the activation message and headed back to the Armory. That's where they would have --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- been joined in with the second shift that was waiting at the Armory?

A Yes.

Q I'm going to move on from the topic of Chief Sund. I don't know if you have any other details?

A I don't. Do you?

Q I just have a quick question about the Chief Sund conversation. So, I just want to make sure it's clear in my head. Did you convey to him -- I know you said explicitly we're still going to need that written request, right?

A Uh-huh.

Q And you mentioned that in our prior interview as well. Is there any
mention that he thought that would be -- that the troops would be on standby, or that they would be able to quickly respond? I'm just trying to understand if there's a gap in the way you conveyed it and what he might have perceived?

A No, I'm a very direct person, very clear. I consistently, repeatedly told him that I would have to have a formal request. Even on January 6th when he called me and said, I'm calling the Secretary of the Army's office right now, 1349. I called over there. I said, Hey, this is what's going on. Steve Sund is -- I mean, it's a terrible call. He needs help right now. And I had already told him, Hey, get a letter generated, you know. And he sent it. About 45 minutes and sometime later --

Q Sure.

A -- I received a letter from Steve Sund. So he always knew he needed to send a letter.

Q Sure.

A There was never any doubt in his mind that -- I don't think -- that a letter had to -- a formal request had to come in.

Q No, no, thank you.

A Did I confuse it now?

Q No, no, no, I'm just wondering if there was a way that that written request would have been processed quickly? Like what if he had gone through -- had he ever gone through that process before?

A I don't think Chief Sund had, because I believe he maybe had 3 years with the Capitol Police. He was with the Metropolitan Police Department prior, but he probably knew about the request. He probably knew from his time with the Metropolitan Police Department that there has to be a formal request. But here's what I would have hoped would have happened, that once I had contacted the Secretary of the
Army, he would have just told me to go, and the paperwork would have followed.

Q    Sure. But -- right.

A    And he did that in June. When the Mayor's office called, we didn't get a formal authorization letter from the Secretary. He looked right at me and said "approved." Go support the city. And we sent -- actually, he and I got into a debate, to the extent that I can debate with him, because the city wanted for us to bring vehicles, military vehicles, and leave the vehicles. I said, Mr. Secretary, we cannot leave these vehicles. We have to have drivers. We have to have people with the vehicles. Look at what happened in L.A., you know. Now, they're not going to take turn over a big Humvee. They're not going to turn it over, but they can vandalize it. You're right.

Q    I'm sorry, this is the summer?

A    This is summer. So we're going, you know, not back, yes, sir, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Secretary, we need to have people with these vehicles. And he said okay. But there was nothing in writing.

Q    Got it. But just back to Chief Sund who was the Chief of Police for the 14 months while you were the head of the D.C. National Guard --

A    Yes.

Q    -- there had never been a request for the D.C. National Guard before --

A    No.

Q    -- January 6th?

A    No, not that I can recall.

Q    Okay. Go ahead. Sorry.

BY: [Redacted]

Q    And that's for the Capitol then. D.C. National Guard did not go to the Capitol over those 14 months?
A Not during my time, no. And we would call them and say, Are you going
to -- do you anticipate needing -- so when the parks were vandalized. So the parks are
right here, the Capitol is right there. Just to get in front of it for planning purposes, not
being late to need, Chief, you going to need us? No, we got it.

Q Let me ask you, so I have a grasp of not telling Secretary McCarthy about the
batons beforehand. But Secretary McCarthy says that one of the reasons why he, you
know, to oversimplify it. One of the reasons why he felt he could talk to sort of -- he
thinks separately as a substantive issue, it's important to come up with a CONOPS
operations. I know there's a little bit of a disagreement, certainly, but he felt that that
was important substantively, but felt the guardsmen had to go back to the Armory
anyway, because that's where their equipment was. Which I know that that is not true,
because they had their equipment in their vehicle, right?

So Secretary McCarthy's response to that would be, quote, "The only thing I
authorized General Walker to do was their ballistic helmets and body armor in the
vehicle, not their shields or their riot batons." And so his impression is I don't know
that. I don't know that I could so quickly deploy them, let's say, from traffic control
points because no one ever told me that they their batons in their vehicles. My
question to you is -- and it may be a function of -- you know, we talked a little bit about
inability to reach Secretary McCarthy. But did you tell Secretary McCarthy or any of its
intermediaries, like General Piatt, at any point that the servicemembers at the traffic
control points were ready to deploy given that they had everything in their vehicles?

A I told him we were ready.

Q So not specifically about --

A Not --

Q -- that their equipment is with them?
A  Yeah, but that we’re ready to go. And here is the deal, sir. My number
didn’t change. My number didn’t change. And I pulled my phone records. I don’t
have any calls from them. So he could have called me. He never did January 6th.
Q  And let’s say, what do you think about the idea, though, that he didn’t know;
he didn’t know that the equipment was available to them in their vehicles? And that he
thinks, I wouldn’t otherwise have known because I told him that could be in the vehicle.
So he would say a fair assumption that they wouldn’t have it because that’s what I
ordered.
A  No, I mean, so there’s a whole menu of options that were available to me.
So let’s say I didn’t have them, I could have quickly put them on buses, put them in a big
truck, and got everything down there, had a rally point, issue everything, and get over to
that Capitol. So all he had to do was call me and say, Look, I know you don’t have the
batons -- if you don’t have the batons, how long is that going to take? And the batons
are already on the bus. That’s what I -- you know, you have to be proactive in this
business of law enforcement, civil unrest. So if they hadn’t had those batons, I’ll give
you an example -- the second shift that came on, that brought them in early, they were
ready to go. They came out there. They had everything was issued at the Armory.
So that just doesn’t -- that’s not a good explanation to me. Call me and say, Mr.
Secretary, I did have the batons in the vehicles. So they’re ready to go now. Go right
to the Capitol. And if I didn’t, all the equipment is on buses, and it’s going to meet the
guardsmen there. I mean, I already knew who was going to deputize them. I had
Colonel Hunter already there. I mean, it’s called leadership. I mean, shame on me if I
don’t know how to do that.
Q  So let’s walk through Lieutenant Colonel Hunter’s testimony to us, which was
incredibly invaluable. You know, he told us about some of the early planning, beginning
at 2:12 p.m. after hearing news of the breach, that he started to put in place, he says, to
get the Guard ready by 3:10 p.m., including designating a rally point, having the
servicemembers at their traffic control points, acknowledge that rally point, ask the QRF
to get in gear and get on buses to get to the Capitol. That's where he thought they were
going to go. And he confirmed to Lieutenant Colonel
Reinke by 2:50 p.m. that they were ready to go. And then, of course, as you mentioned,
he linked up with Assistant Chief Carroll and Chief Sund, physically, present at the Capitol
Police Headquarters with them. And he said that he had done all this and he was
prepared at 3:10 p.m., called Brigadier General Ryan to report to his direct supervisor all
that he had done.

So when we're trying to figure out then how that then got to you and how fast
that got to you, when, if at all, did you first hear about what Lieutenant Colonel Hunter
had done on the ground?

A Well, Hunter had called me as well and General Ryan had called me. I
mean, you met Colonel Hunter.

Q Uh-huh.

A He is a full colonel now. He was a lieutenant colonel then. He's a war
college graduate. I don't know, what, if he shared his background. He is the future of
the District of Columbia National Guard. I fully expect him to be a general officer.

Hunter, on his own initiative, called me and said, Hey, sir, this is what I've done. Roger.
Keep going. You know, just keep me updated. So he had the rally point, he had talked
to everybody, he did what an officer is expected to do, take initiative, execute, and keep
me informed.

Q And I think this is going to be a similar answer, but I just want to get it on the
record. Secretary McCarthy, of course, told us that he had no idea any of the things that
Lieutenant Colonel Hunter had done. And when asked whose responsibility was it to inform him, he said it was yours. In part, you know, you've just explained how your subordinate called you to inform you of all the things that he had done to get the Guard ready. Why didn't you call, or visit in person, Secretary McCarthy, to let him know that the Guard had already handled all of the planning, all of the logistics that he, in his mind, thought he needed to do himself?

A So I couldn't get in touch with the Secretary. With all the technology we have, not just this phone, but I had a government phone, U.S. Army phone. I could not get through to him. Radically different, Colonel Matthews had a private number for the Secretary. They know each other socially. He couldn't get through to the Secretary of the Army. The story we were told is that he is running through the Pentagon looking for the Secretary of Defense. That's why he wasn't answering the phone. So how can I brief him? How can I update him when I can't get through to him? And I'm going between Lieutenant General Walter Piatt to relay messages.

Q So we'll go through that whole timeline. I'm going to break down basically in half-hour chunks what Secretary McCarthy said he was doing to sort of get your feedback?

A It has me a little annoyed because I'm reliving it, and I'm frustrated that, you know, I can't reach you to make a decision.

Q Right.

A And then I'm talking to Piatt and Flynn and the rest of these guys. I said, you see what's happening? We're right down the street. The D.C. Armory is right down the street.

Q And that's a good segue. You know, you've explained to us the cell phone, you know, his number wasn't working, he didn't call you. What about physically? Let's
talk about that. And why didn't you go down to the Pentagon?

A If they can't find him, how am I? You know, there was no -- they couldn't
find him, he's running through Pentagon, is what they said. So my instinct was to go to
police headquarters. And not MPD headquarters, Capitol Police Headquarters. Hunter
said, Sir, I got it here. I have it here. I'm with Chief Carroll. I don't know if you talked
to Chief Carroll.

Q Yes.

A And Chief Carroll says, Where is the National Guard? I'll let you fill that in.
You know, and I later linked up with Chief Carroll that night. So nobody was calling -- I
couldn't get through the Secretary. I would have gladly told him, Hey, sir, we're ready to
go.

Q And the last question I have then is just the only channel would have been
the generals that you're on the VTC with. Did you tell them, you know, Lieutenant
Colonel Hunter is in X, Y, and Z, the Guard is ready, there is no planning?

A Yeah, they kept asking me for the plan, and I kept briefing it to them. I kept
telling them. Then they said, well, where is your casualty evacuation plan? And that

Q Right.

A And I said that, it's 9-1-1.

BY:

Q Did you tell them the amount of detail that Colonel Hunter had provided to
you? Did you convey that on the video call?

A We know where we're going to be, we know who we're going to report to,
and we know what's going to be asked of us. And we're right down the street. I kept
saying that. And then he started talking about how we're going to remission. I said,
Sir, you know, Sir, and I just kept, you know, trying to be polite, but I'm really losing my patience. When you ask me for a casualty evacuation plan, did we have one in the summer? No. Do we have medics organic to us? Do we have medics, combat medics? District of Columbia National Guard, you walk around the D.C. Guard, you won't find many guardsmen that haven't served in combat. We know what we're doing. I mean, I served in Afghanistan. I mean, everybody on the D.C. Guard, I can't think of anybody on that leadership team that hadn't been in the unforgiving crucible of combat.

Q So let's go through the afternoon where Secretary McCarthy, what he was doing through the afternoon, get your reactions to it. So, you know, there's obviously the 2:30 call. I don't have any questions about that. We went through that pretty extensively last time. And we know of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon; gets there, converses with him. It's about a half hour at 3:04, right, in the timeline. That's when Acting Secretary Miller approves the D.C. Guard. And it's actually the language says that he activated, or approved the activation of the D.C. Guard. But I want to tell you what Active Secretary Miller told us, which is that at 3:04, he believed, the D.C. Guard, quote, "had all the authorizations they needed to conduct operations in support of law enforcement at the Capitol," end quote. And when asked why servicemembers weren't deployed from that moment at 3 p.m., here is what Secretary Miller said. Quote, "Why didn't he" -- as in you, General Walker -- "why didn't he launch them? I'd love to know. I've launched QRFs without approval more than once. If you're the person on the ground in the Army, and you realize there's something that is unpredictable or unexpected, and you have the ability to influence the culture, the training, the education, the expectation of you, the American people, is that you will execute and do what you can, even if it costs you your job. The person on the ground is paid is closest to the
action and has an understanding. General Walker is a two-star general and completely within his agreement to employ his QRF if he thinks it’s such an essential point in these situations," end quote. What do you have to say to that?

A  I agree with everything he said totally. And I would have done just that, but not for those two letters. So his statement’s at war with the letter that he sent. But when he’s talking there, he is talking as an American soldier. And I am trained to do that. And that’s why it was so difficult to not go and do it because 39 years, I have worn the cloth of the United States, 39 years. And that’s what officers do. And to have this -- you’ve seen the two letters.

Q  Right. No -- yes, sir.

A  It’s very clear.

Q  And at least on Secretary McCarthy’s part, you know, he agreed -- well, I guess Secretary Miller seems to think that he’s already given his authorization, and that you pretty much have all the authorities you need. But Secretary McCarthy agrees with you that that’s where maybe they had a miscommunication, Secretary McCarthy and Acting Secretary Miller because he thought he had the authority, but he had not yet passed it down to you. And that’s why, of course, it’s not until 2 hours later --

A  But can I ask you a question?

Q  Yeah.

A  So I never spoke to Secretary Miller.

Q  Right. So let me ask you about that.

A  Yeah, so how did he direct me to do it?

Q  No, not that he directed you, but that he felt he had already given all approvals. That there was no need to either return to him afterwards or really for Secretary McCarthy to sort of, on his own, withhold approval. He could have given that
to you at that moment, and he considered it that you were to have that at that moment, the approval. But let me give you another quote from Secretary Miller. He says, "Clearly there was a communications problem somewhere in there. If felt he was in jam" -- this is you -- "and he wasn't getting the support he needed, or better yet, if he didn't have the communications ability" -- because that happens all the time that your cell phone coverage doesn't work, you know, "there's plenty of opportunity. He could have bypassed McCarthy and come straight into the Pentagon, and I would have been happy to give him additional guidance," end quote. So my question is why didn't you do what Acting Secretary Miller saying you could have done which is go over McCarthy's head and call or visit Secretary Miller himself?

A Have you been in the Army?

Q No, sir. My parents both, but not myself.

A You just don't go over somebody's head. It wouldn't -- so the option I had was his first one, to just go do it, but not to go over the Secretary of the Army's head, but just take it upon myself. And when I think about it, you know, I'm still conflicted. I mean, I trust the lawyers who made it real clear to me that I could not do it; that I shouldn't do it. And there were soldiers, Army and Air saying, Sir, why aren't we out there? I mean, you can see it on TV. Every television in the Armory, and so, that was a struggle as well. And so I don't -- and we were sued over the summer by a lot of people. So I'm thinking, well, are the soldiers protected if they're going on me saying go? And lawyers, with all due respect to lawyers, you know, so four of them, you'll get nine opinions. So I didn't really know what do. But they kind of convinced me, wait for authorization. So that's what I did. But he -- Miller talking as an Army Green Beret. That's what he was, Ranger, Special Forces, Colonel. He is right. You know, in the absence of orders, seize the initiative. Do it. And that's what I wanted to do. But
that same Secretary gave me a piece of paper telling me that completely contradicts, you
know, how he's trained and in what he wrote.

Q    So let's talk about 3 o'clock. Secretary McCarthy, of course, said he spoke
with you at 3:04, which I know you categorically deny.

A    Where did he call me? So, I pulled my phone bills.

Q    But let me tell you how he -- just so it helps that -- you know, I know you said
there's no conversation, but I want to give you the opportunity to hear how he
characterized the call. Secretary McCarthy said he gave General Walker a call. He told
him to -- this is after Acting Secretary Miller had given him approval -- he told him to,
quote, mobilize the entire Guard, bring everybody in. And I said, you know, move the
QRF to the Armory and get as many people as you can to the Armory, and configure them
in a minimum of riot gear and batons. And we're going to do a mission analysis of what
we need to do with the police. And, of course, you have told us that, quote, "I actually,
on my own, moved the Quick Reaction Force from Joint Base Andrews to the Armory." I
know it's difficult. How can you reconcile that for us in any way that he has a
recollection of a conversation for, like, things he actually said with the idea that, you
know, no call at all even happened, even through an intermediary? Can you help us
understand?

A    Well, the theater of his mind, you know, it's his show. Here is what I can
tell you. There's a whole list of people who know that I directed the Quick Reaction
Force to leave Andrews Air Force Base on my own and stage them at the D.C. Armory.
Everybody involved, after I said, go do that, I told General Dean. General Dean told
Ryan. Ryan, I believe, called General, it might have been a colonel at the time, Campo.
And they started moving.

Q    Let me ask you --
A  We brought them under police escort. They went from Andrews Air Force Base, police escort, back to the Armory. And they were the first ones at the Capitol, that Quick Reaction Force.

Q  Can I ask you, why was the Quick Reaction Force at Joint Base Andrews to begin with and not the Armory? What's the advantage of having them just at the beginning of the day there?

A  Yeah, so I had them doing their regular job. And it was a just in case -- the Quick Reaction Force was just in case, Hey, if something goes bad, the police escort could be there in 15, 20 minutes. So it was just a -- I put that in there as a just-in-case. This Quick Reaction Force, I asked for it.

Q  So is that what their job is at the Joint Base Andrews --

A  We needed airmen.

Q  Okay.

A  So this Quick Reaction Force was made up of airmen, U.S. Air Force people.

Q  I see. And so, if you had just to say, went into the Armory instead, they wouldn't have been doing their jobs, their normal day jobs, you'd want them at the Joint Base Andrews so they can --

A  Yeah, and hopefully the plan was that they would -- if I needed them, they would be there.

Q  So --

BY

Q  Can I ask a quick clarifying question? Just so the record is clear, so the reason why you say the airmen were at Joint Base Andrews because that's where their job is because Joint Base Andrews is, in fact, an Air Force Base?

A  Yes.
Q And airmen are enlisted members of the Air Force?
A Right.
Q Okay.
A There were offices there, too. The Lieutenant Colonel Reinke, I think, was there. The lieutenant colonel that was the -- were they a group or a squadron? He was the commander, and then he led --
Q Who would have been commander?
A It would have been --
Q Was he Air Force wing commander?
A He would have been a squadron. I think a squadron.
Q Okay. Okay.
A I am embarrassed to tell you that I don’t know the air as well as I should. But, yeah, I’m pretty sure he was the squadron group, squadron wing.
Q Yes, sir.
Q Let’s talk about the move to the armory for the QRF.
A Uh-huh.
Q So Lieutenant Colonel Hunter told us he didn’t quite understand the logic. When he ordered Lieutenant Reinke to gear up and get the QRF from the bus back at 2:17 p.m., he said, quote, I thought that they would just come to me straight to the Capitol. Lieutenant Reinke himself said he wasn’t expecting to be brought to the armory, learning first about it was while they were already mid-route to the armory.
A Uh-huh.
Q They already had their equipment. They had already trained for 2 days in civil disturbance, which was their own lead mission. They had not worked a single minute doing traffic control, the original mission for -- so they didn’t need remissioning in
any real sense.

Why not just have them go to the rally point at the Capitol directly, especially because, you know, the so-called CONOP ended up being what you had always known it was going to be, which is go and assist law enforcement? What benefit was it for the QRF to actually head to the armory?

A They didn't have commission yet. You know, I couldn't just send them in -- well, I mean, according to Mr. Miller I could have, but his letter said I couldn't. So I'm still waiting for this green light, and that's what General McConville called it. He said you have a green light. And at 1708, he said you have a green light.

So they were frustrated, I was frustrated. Everybody in their heart knew they could make a difference. Why are we not going to the Capitol? And I received a lot of criticism from my office ever since -- even from some of the NCOs. Sir, why won't you just make the decision?

Q Right.

A You know, well, that piece of paper that I know would have been used against me if I just went on and did it. But that's why -- at least they were closer. From Andrews Air Force Base to the armory is right down the street.

Q Okay.

A But they were ready to go. And they're right, Lieutenant Colonel Reinke, hey, this doesn't make sense. You know, I didn't know he said that, but it's a natural reaction.

Q And one thing -- and maybe this is a little bit of the, you know, two hands -- the right hand and the left hand not being able to communicate with one another -- is that the time it took for people to assemble at the armory is one of the reasons that Secretary McCarthy says again that he had time to put together this
CONOPS.

Let me read what he says. He maintained that even if, let's say, the QRF could have been deployed straight from the Joint Base Andrews when Lieutenant Colonel Hunter at 3:10 p.m. says everything is ready, and the traffic control point members -- now he knows, obviously, sitting with us, that they have their gear, they have their weaponry, and they're ready to be deployed. And they don't need to go back to the armory, right? And then the second shift is already at the armory. They're already at the armory, and they already have their equipment. Everybody may be in three different locations, but they're all ready to go down to the rally point without having to go to the armory.

He maintains that the value is of them physically joining the rest of the forces all in one at the armory so they could be told their mission all together. Quote, getting eyeball to eyeball with adjustment units so they would go through their five paragraph op order, which of course is subparagraph op order in this case. But General McConville says, so the bottom line is, you've got to bring them back to the armory. You had to kind of get them all together. You had to figure out, okay, what do you want them to do when they go to the Capitol?

Secretary McCarthy, again, we needed to bring them all together because we needed to have a clear understanding of just how we were going to be successful here, Secretary McCarthy.

In hindsight, do you think that it was -- maybe it was a mistake to send over the QRF to the armory, have forces in transport, lending at least the impression of some leaders within the Department of Defense. There's time anyway. They need to go back. They need to get their things. Would it have been better to maintain the forces at their separate locations so that they wouldn't have, I guess, that excuse, that justification that there was a delay because of travel time?
A  No. So to -- I need the Air Force people closer in. Andrews and the
armory, it's not next door. So I needed them closer to, you know, time, distance. So,
in my mind, I asked for a quick reaction force. I'm pretty sure I would have recognized
the need for, in time, to bring them to whatever challenge they may have faced. As I'm
watching and seeing what's going on at the Capitol, I need them here closer. Bring
them. I moved them. Told -- and Hunter calls Reinke. Colonel Hunter calls, get here
right now, get the police out there to escort them in. Here's the deal.

So I had Colonel Hunter there with Chief Carroll and other white shirts. And I
told the Army leadership there were white shirts, leaders in the Capitol Police in the
Metropolitan Police Department. We had people designated to deputize D.C.
guardsmen and put them to work. Take the -- the National Guard -- the military is never
in charge. We're always under civilian control. And those civilians were members of
the Capitol Police, leaders. I made that very clear.

Here's the bottom line. The Secretary was unavailable to me, and he never
called me. So I couldn't reach him, and he never called me. And if he had, I would
explain to him in detail here's what we're doing. I mean, they don't -- the Active Duty
Army doesn't do civil unrest, civil disturbance. They don't do that. The National
Guard, in my experience, goes back to Hurricane Andrew in 1992 in Florida. I've done
this. They don't know the National Guard mission and how we're ready to practice civil
unrest, civil disobedience, civil disorder. And we proved it during the summer, and we
didn't hurt anybody.

Q  So let me get your just opinion on the record. It sounds as though you
don't agree with Secretary McCarthy that there was any value in having them all come
back to the armory to hear their mission. It was mostly just moving the QRF to the
armory just in the meanwhile because you had not gotten approval and it would have put
them closer to the Capitol. But you don't agree that necessarily it's important to have all your disparate parts of the D.C. Guard come to the armory to hear their mission together and then be deployed to that area?

A So the lion’s share of the support was that the armory on buses, on buses. I don't know if you talked to Command Sergeant Major Brooks?

Q Yes, sir.

A Did he tell you that everybody was on a bus?

Q Yes.

A Did he tell you where the buses were?

Q Didn't they pull in to the drill floor?

A We pulled onto the drill floor.

Q Yeah.

A And so all the news media asking where is the Guard --

Q Couldn’t see it.

A -- couldn't see it.

Q Right.

A I went down there. NCOs brief soldiers and airmen on the buses. Here's the mission. Here's what you’re getting ready to do. If we need a five-paragraph order, they would give it to them right on the bus. So I didn’t. And then as you get there, that NCO is going to tell you, hey, here's what we’re facing, here's what we’re getting ready to do.

Q And all of that can be done at the rally point, I guess is what I want to --

A All of that could have been done en route under police escort. So that’s why Colonel Reinke, who knew what he was going to be doing because Colonel Hunter told him, that’s why he wanted to go straight there.
Q  Right.
A  But I didn't have -- as the Chief of Staff of the Army said -- I didn't have the
     green light --
Q  Right.
A  -- that was given to me at 1708.  Lieutenant Nick, I don't know if you talked
to him.
Q  Yes, sir, we did.
A  And he repeatedly said --
     so he can be trusted, I hope -- he said, sir, they're doing everything they can to delay it.
     Q  Well, so let me go through that.  Let me go through that with you.  So
     we're now at 3:00, 3 o'clock, and 30 minutes of Secretary McCarthy's time, according to
     him, at that point was spent reassuring Members of Congress that the Guard was indeed
     coming.
     So you told us about the 2:30 call and, you know, you recall, in quote, that Chief
     Contee said, I'm going to call the Mayor and ask her to have a press conference saying
     that the Army is not going to allow the D.C. Guard to come and support.  And this is
     what General Piatt says he told Secretary McCarthy about that direct quote.  The third
     time when they said that, you're denying a request, they also said, and we're going to the
     media.  We were desperate, everyone was desperate.  So I'm not angry at that, but I
     just knew it wasn't helpful.  So we told that to Secretary McCarthy.
     And so in addition to that alleged threat on the 2:30 phone call, a media tweet
     had gone out at 2:55 p.m., declaring that the Department of Defense had denied request
     for Guard support.  So this is what Secretary McCarthy said he spent the next, around
     25 minutes doing:  So when the next 25 minutes of literally standing there, people
     handing me telephones, whether it was the media or it was Congress.  And I had to
explain to all of them, no, we're coming, we're coming, we're coming. So that chewed up a great deal of time, end quote.

I'm going to go in 30-minute chunks. But what's your view on that explanation of, you know, at least between 3:00 and 3:30, that is what Secretary McCarthy was doing and would -- you know, understanding that, you know, he decided he was going to put together a CONOP that kept him at least in those 30 minutes from putting together that CONOP. Do you have anything -- a reaction to that?

A Well, it's an explanation. I was wondering what he was doing, why he wasn't calling me, why I couldn't get through. I mean, if that was more important in his mind than to call me and tell me to go or take a call from me, I mean, if that's what he says he was doing. I mean, I don't know what he was doing. I have no clue.

Here's what I know, he wasn't available to me.

Q And, you know, he talked about it's the Speaker of the House on his cell phone. You know, I'm going to take the call. I wanted to give assurances, not hand this off to one of my military assistants to let them know, you know, the leaders, congressional leaders, people who were calling him that they were definitely coming.

A I would have hoped he could have done that by phone and came to the armory and then met with Chief Sund, which I did. I mean, when I finally got through to him, it was after 6:00, he was at police headquarters.

Q Right.

A I said, I'm looking -- I said, sir, where are you? He said, I'm at police headquarters. Where are you at? I said, I'm at police headquarters.

The Capitol Police headquarters, that's where it's going on. He's at Metropolitan Police headquarters. So he tells me to come over there. I go. And I see the Mayor and I see the Chief Contee. And they were, like, General Walker, you know, and -- I'll let
you talk to Chief Contee and see what he thought about it. Because Chief Contee is the
one that said, I'm going to ask the Mayor to have a press conference and tell everybody.
And Piatt said, please don't do that.

Q   I guess, do you have an appreciation for the idea that, given that threat and
a tweet that had gone out saying the Department of Defense isn't coming, they're not
coming to help support the Capitol, that the Secretary of the Army would need to -- you
know, would get a lot of calls from leadership, from people meaning for that to be
dispelled, for them to be instilled with confidence, no, of course, we haven't rejected, you
know, the request for support?

A   If you're asking me what I think, I don't sympathize with that. Here's the
best way he could have solved that. His personal presence standing next to me at the
Capitol, standing next to me and my soldiers and airmen. What would better
demonstrate that we're coming? Our presence. Hey, I'm en route. I'm going to
swing by, pick up General Walker, and we'll be there. Or, I'm going to link up with
General Walker. I'm calling him right now at 3 o'clock instead of having a press
conference. General Walker, get there immediately. And it wasn't till 1708 that
General McConville says you have a green light.

Q   So let's walk through it. After the phone calls, there's about 30 minutes of
travel from the Pentagon down to the Metropolitan Police Department headquarters.
He arrives at 4:10 p.m. And then there's about 30 minutes, because as you know, we'll
get to there's -- he asserts there's a phone call with you at 4:30. So there's about
30 minutes of -- or 20 minutes of developing the concept of defense -- the concept of
operations, which, you know, he had said that he had learned the lesson from the
summer, it's important at the Secretarial level to have a strategic vision to not just send
troops, but to have a concept of operations put together. Of course, that's his view, and
I know that you differ from him on that.

But he says -- or the generals on the VTC -- we talked a little bit about it, but I just
want to briefly have you react. They said that as Secretary McCarthy is there at the D.C.
headquarters, he spreads out a map alongside Chief Contee.

A At the D.C.?

Q Excuse me. Yeah, D.C. MPD. I meant MPD. D.C. Police.

Metropolitan Police Department headquarters. He spread out a map of the city,
alongside Chief Contee, with his Army Operations Director Brigadier General Chris
LaNeve. And then Chief Carroll's by phone, because he's over at the Capitol Police
headquarters. And he says General Piatt says this, how he was helping from the VTC
call, quote, As he was working that plan with Chief Contee and the Mayor at downtown,
we were getting requirements. And we were feeding him information on General
Walker's ability. What we called in the Army, we call it generating combat power. As
he's building those numbers, he's actually lining up vehicles, getting soldier packages
ready to go. So when the Secretary has an approved plan, he can go.

And the him is you, I believe, in that last sentence. Is that how you would
characterize what you and the generals were doing on the VTC call, assisting Secretary
McCarthy with the development of his CONOP by building the numbers, lining up
vehicles, getting soldier packages ready to go, so that when there's a plan you can go?

A I know you're asking the questions, but did you ever see the CONOP that the
Secretary put together?

Q He says there's not one written, no. That it was verbally conveyed.

A Yeah. So -- okay.

Q So what is the quick description --

A It's nonsense. Yeah. That's a one-word reaction. Why didn't he have a
D.C. guardsman with him? General LaNeve is an Active Duty Army one-star who's now the commanding general of the 82nd Airborne Division. Why -- promoted after this. Why wouldn't he not have somebody from the District of Columbia National Guard, who knows the city, who knows the Capitol, the Capitol policemen in the District of Columbia National Guard. We have Federal agents in the District of Columbia National Guard.

You're going to plan something with the Mayor?

And I'll share this with you. When I got there, the Mayor, the chief, they looked at me, and I could tell they were tolerating the Secretary of the Army. They were tolerating him. I don't think he added any value there, because you needed D.C. guardsmen to execute whatever plan they came up with. They're going to come up with a plan that the D.C. Guard's going to execute, and the D.C. Guard's not there?

I'm frustrated just thinking about this and how outrageous it is that you wouldn't have either my operations officer, my logistics officer, my planning officer. Why wouldn't you have those people there with you if you're not even going to have me or the acting general or General Ryan, the task force commander, none of those people were invited to the meeting.

And here's a flash. We could have got to police headquarters faster than him. So why would you not have anyone from the D.C. Guard? And what is General LaNeve going to do, an active Army general who cannot direct -- he's an Active Duty title 10 officer. He cannot direct title 32 officers.

Q Let's talk about General LaNeve. So at 4:30, Secretary McCarthy -- and I know, again, this is -- I'm going to go over a conversation that I know -- you say it didn't happen, but I want you to hear it --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- the description so that -- to hear your take on it.
Secretary McCarthy said he conveyed two things through Brigadier General LaNeve. So I want to make clear, Secretary McCarthy does not say that he personally gave you the green light. He said that it was conveyed through General LaNeve. So the two things that he says he conveyed to you through General LaNeve was the green light and then where to go and to whom to report. That that's the sort of two details that General LaNeve at least remembers conveying to you.

So let me go through the details recounting of the conversation, starting with Secretary McCarthy's. He says he was at a table writing talking points, preparing for the press conference with Mayor Bowser slated for 4:45 p.m. General LaNeve was standing next to him, quote, literally relaying all the details from the conversation that we had had. He means the 20-minute conversation where they developed the CONOP. Although he was, quote, multitasking, Secretary McCarthy said he overheard that, quote, he told him, with a mission, put all a hundred, I think it was 150 forces together to support static security, and they will be employed. I think that's the east side of the Capitol where they're conducting clearing operations, and they would flow in the direction. Like I said, it would be, what, north to south. And then he had said, you're going to link up at First and D, because that's the rally point. Assistant Chief Carroll -- and that's the person to link up with. And he went through specifics of the linkup points. Who you're going to work for, rules of engagement, the configuration of equipment, things of that nature.

We asked him: Could the person on the other end of the line have misconstrued these plans as just plans and not an express authorization to deploy? And this is what he said. No, he said. I mean, they talked pretty clearly.

I know that you've said that you hadn't had a conversation either with Secretary McCarthy or General LaNeve. But I do want to direct you to the notes that Lieutenant Nick provided to us, because there does appear to be an entry at 4:37 p.m., which would
be the time that both Secretary McCarthy and Brigadier General LaNeve said they spoke
to you. And he wrote down, quote, advised to send 150 to establish D Street, First
Street, outer perimeter. It says then, General LaNeve, as if that's where the information
came from, and then beside a number which appears to be the number for General
LaNeve.

So how do you think it is that Lieutenant Nick got that information on his notes?
If you could explain that for us.

A So the only way he could have got it was listening to the VTC, which I was on.
And I couldn't have been on the VTC and have a call with General LaNeve. So it must
have been stated during the VTC.

But here's what also was stated during the VTC, that the Chief of Staff of the
Army, the most senior Army officer said you got to go at 1708. Never received a green
light before then. So at 1637, or 4:37 -- and I saw Lieutenant Nick's note. And he says
send 150 to -- first of all, there's First and D.

Q Uh -huh.

A First and D Southwest, Northwest?

Q Right.

A What First and D? You know, and then why would I ever take directions
from General LaNeve? Anybody? Brigadier General LaNeve, one-star. If I was going
to take the -- General Piatt, General Flynn, General McConville, yes, sir, but not General
LaNeve.

Q So let me go through that, but then -- so is it possible that that information
was conveyed by General LaNeve on the VTC, that that call, he wasn't --

A Never saw him on the VTC. I never saw General LaNeve on the VTC.

Q Okay.
A  So I'm not sure where Lieutenant Nick got that from. But for him to
say -- and, I mean, I trust him. He's a great
lieutenant. He's got a future in the Army. But is he saying that I was repeating what
LaNeve was saying? I mean, how does he know? I mean, I saw it. It said, you know,
it said 150. Send 150, and it said First and D. And then I can barely see -- that's why I
said, hey, I can't make this out. Type it up.

Q  Sure.

A  And then he typed it up. And let's just see if I have this timeline where he
talks about this.

Q  And let me be clear, Lieute- -- it's not Lieutenant Nick who says that you
received a call from?

A  No, Lieutenant Nick was taking the notes.

Q  Right. He's just doing some notes. Right. General LaNeve is -- okay.

A  Yeah. So advise possible to send 150 D Street and First Street to establish
an outer perimeter. Possible to send?

Q  So let me -- so I don't see possible on the notes, but maybe it's P-O-S-S.

A  Yeah, this is his. He typed it up.

Q  Let me ask you then, in this -- it sounds as though -- you know, you said you
didn't see LaNeve visually on the screen, but he's referring to an auditory call. Is it
possible that you can call in to a VTC and maybe it was General LaNeve's voice that you
and Lieutenant Nick overheard as part of the VTC?

A  Well, I didn't hear General LaNeve's voice. And I --

Q  Okay.

A  But I'm not saying that -- I was focused on the Chief of Staff of the Army,
General Flynn, General Piatt, listening to them.
Q. It could be possible. This phone call that Brigadier General LaNeve says happened, and that Secretary McCarthy says happened, could have been him calling into the VTC. And I understand that you would not have participated in the conversation, you were doing other things, but that -- is it possible that that is who he was talking to, a VTC, that apparently he understood it to be you on the other line?

A. Anything's possible, but I don't think that's what happened. And it doesn't absolve the fact that, why would Chief of Staff of the Army tell me 30 minutes later at 1708 that, hey, we have a green light, you're approved to go?

Q. So let me just go through what LaNeve says. I do want to alert you for his part, General LaNeve denies himself conveying the go order. He says that he overhears Secretary McCarthy do it, to say -- give it to you over the phone. Although Secretary McCarthy's version is that it was all through LaNeve, and he didn't speak directly to you on this second call.

A. Say that again. So that --

Q. Yeah. It was convoluted. My apologies.

General LaNeve says that he himself is not the one who conveyed the go order, but he did overhear Secretary McCarthy convey the go order to you on the phone call at 4:30.

So let me -- actually, let me just read it for you. It's a little bit easier if I just read it.

General LaNeve said he spoke with General Walker first at 4:25 p.m. So he said he had two calls with you. At 4:25, to tell him that his forces should, quote, get on the bus, do not leave. He said he assumed General Walker knew Secretary McCarthy was next to him because it was the Secretary who handed the phone to him to begin with. I would have no reason to talk to General Walker outside of assisting Secretary McCarthy,
LaNeve said.

On second call at 4:35 p.m., 10 minutes later, LaNeve said he overheard McCarthy himself convey the go order to General Walker. He said something, quote, to the effect of you're approved to provide support. LaNeve said the Secretary then again handed him the phone to give the details of where to go and what officer to meet up with. He even recalled General Walker saying, Roger, to acknowledge the plan. But LaNeve said there was, quote, mass confusion in the room, and he agreed that there were huge communications problems.

I take it that you rejected any of that occurred?

A Other than there was mass confusion. I agree with that.

Q As far as recognizing that LaNeve spoke with the authority of the Secretary, according to Secretary McCarthy, LaNeve wasn't a junior aide in his role. He can speak once given the authority, delegated authority, to speak as a Secretary of the Army. He said it should have been clear to General Walker that the first-star officer was speaking on his behalf because he was standing next to me. And General Platt said it was generally not uncommon for him to ask his staff to transmit communication from the Secretary to General Walker.

On his part, LaNeve said he had plenty of interactions with General Walker over the summer, in particular, conceded that he didn't ever recall speaking on Secretary McCarthy's behalf before. But he distinctly recalls General Walker's voice on the other end, and quote, I have a speech impediment, so I'm pretty sure he recognized me too.

What do you say to that? You mentioned, I don't take my orders from General LaNeve. What's your reaction to their position that you would have recognized, if you were speaking to General LaNeve, that he was speaking obviously for the Secretary?

A I would have hoped I would have been able to discern that he was speaking;
that the Secretary wants me to convey this to you; the Secretary said for you to do A, B, C; the Secretary of the Army wants this done. And I don’t recall any of that.

Q    Let’s talk about 5:09, which is the green light, as you understood it.

General McConville, he said he heard about the 4:35 call, the green light call, walked by the teleconference screen and was, quote, surprised to see the commanding general sitting, you know, waiting by at 5:09 p.m. This is how he put it, quote, I walked in, I looked up there, and I saw General Walker, he said. I said, hey, you've got all the authorities you need. He goes, yeah. And I go, okay. You know, are you -- and he said, well, what do you want me to do, Chief? And I go, well, my recommendation is go command your unit and get on down there and get after it. And I don’t know what happened, why he didn’t take the call from the Secretary.

Can I have your recounting of how that conversation with General McConville went, whether it was like that?

A    So he came in to the call and said, hey, you have a green light, you're a go. And I would hope that everybody else you talk to remembers that that’s what he said, you have a green light.

Q    You don't recall any sort of sense of surprise from him that you were --

A    No.

Q    Okay.

A    No. I mean, General McConville is a very direct -- he's a four-star U.S. Army General. I think he would have admonished me if he knew that I had permission to go at 4:37. I think he would have given me some feedback.

BY [REDACTED]:

Q    Just on that point, sir.

Sorry, [REDACTED].
Isn't it -- I mean, the Chief of Staff, so Army General McConnell, is not part of the
chain of command to give you an order, right?

A No, he can't. He's not in the chain of command, but he is the Chief of Staff
of the entire Army. So if he asked me to do something, I would do it. So the green
light from him -- I know that that green light from him came from somebody that he
reports to.

Q Whereas, if there was a conversation with Brigadier General LaNeve, you
would not perceive it in the same way?

A Not necessarily. Yeah. My thinking was, especially over the summer, I
didn't get any direction from General LaNeve. He was out there during the summer.
He works for the Secretary of the Army. Everything I got during the summer came
directly from the Secretary of the Army. And in my thinking, he would have picked up
the phone and called me. Or he would have had -- like he told me, go through General
Piatt. He would have had General Piatt. And we did a lot of that. General Piatt
started being this in-between, but I didn't see General LaNeve as an in-between,
especially directing me to do something.

Q But also, General Piatt's not part of that chain of command?

A He's not. So here's the chain of command: President, SecDef, Sec of
Army, me. That's how it went.

Q So I'm just trying to clarify the chain of command versus the perception of
who you would take the direction from.

A To me, if the Chief of Staff of the Army said the Secretary of the Army wants
you to do A, B, C; Roger, sir, and I'd go do it. I never had that with General LaNeve
before. I mean, he's not a peer, it wouldn't be somebody that would convey that type
of a message to me.
Q    Right.
A    So my thinking wouldn’t have been that he would have been speaking on behalf of the Secretary.
Q    And just so I’m clear on the notes of Lieutenant Nick, he — Lieutenant Nick — always been confused about a video setup of how this has happened. But you’re at the armory. Is Lieutenant Nick with you in that room?
A    Yes.
Q    And then who are you seeing on the screen during this 4:30 to 5 p.m. time period?
A    So people were coming and going, but it was mostly General Piatt, General Flynn. There were others that would come off and on the screen. You know, they would pop up, pop off. But General McConville. Consistently, General Piatt and General Flynn.
Q    But you’re also able to receive phone calls?
A    Oh, yeah. I never left the room. I mean, I was right there. And I want to be respectful of your time. I have about no more than 30 minutes if you’re available for that?
General Walker. Yeah, I can do that.
[Thank you.]
General Walker. But I better take a quick bio break. Is that okay?
[Sure. We're off the record.]
[Recess.]
We’re back on the record.
BY [Name]
Q    Lieutenant Colonel Hunter estimated that, had his preparation, you know,
been green-lighted all the way up the chain at the point, you know, that he's there calling
at 3:10 and saying -- you know, letting you know of all the things they'd done, that the
D.C. Guard could have arrived as early as an hour and a half earlier than they did. So
this is how he crunches the numbers, and I want to get your impression.

He says, quote, within 1 hour, I'd say I could have had 135 servicemembers. So
the 40 coming from Joint Base Andrews, that they would have headed directly to meet at
the Capitol, and then the 90 I had on the street, and that were including myself, he said.
So I arrived at the Capitol at 3:10. If I would have re-called everyone by 3:30, 3:40, we
could have been -- had gear on and walking towards the Capitol by that point.

He estimated it would take another hour to empty out the armory. Quote, I
would given them another hour, so by 4:40, I should have had at least 250 coming from
the armory, that includes the second shift as well as full-timers.

Does that timing seem fair to you, or what are your views on how fast and how
many?

A: That's about right. Yeah. That's about right.

Q: This is how Secretary McCarthy put it, so I want to get your reaction.

Presented with the plans, Lieutenant Colonel Hunter set in motion and the
accessibility of their equipment. Both, of course, were unknown to Secretary McCarthy.
He conceded that, quote, you could have shaved minutes, and the speed of deployment
could have been pushed up, but it depends. Even if they got to the rally point earlier, it
would have required them to sit there and explain, here's what you're going to do. So
you know, there's more than just getting to the rally point. They have to clearly
understand what it is they're being asked to do.

He said, although Lieutenant Colonel Hunter was thinking about the right way, he
maintains that what I ultimately worked out with the Mayor as we progressed through
the timeline here is how are we going to support you? Because with Colonel Hunter, nor I, had that given time was what is the situation at the Capitol and in the building? How are you going to clear the clearing operations that you would conduct in the Capitol? What direction are you going? How are you going to try to flush the protesters out the building and then ultimately lock the building down and secure it, so we can get the Members back in and certify? It was going to be a very complex operation that we were required to really work with the main efforts, end quote.

What's your reaction to that?

A There's a lot of leap there. I mean, it was not -- our job was to help the Capitol Police. It wasn't all the other things he was talking about. It was, how we're going to clear the building? Nobody asked us to do that. If we would have got there in time, we could have helped reinforce the line. And that's what Chief Sund wanted to prevent the breach in the first place, and then push people off the Capitol Grounds, especially the front of the Capitol. You know, all this other stuff that he's talking about, nobody asked. I don't think we would have been asked to do that.

Q There's some talk about the numbers and whether the numbers themselves would have been significant enough to save the day, to have assisted with the securing of the Capitol had they been deployed earlier. So General Milley acknowledged that there were some forces prepositioned as part of the Mayor's request. But everyone, except for the guys who were doing the traffic control points and except for that little 40-man reaction force, the rest of the D.C. Guard is going from a cold start. So you're talking about, of course, the 1,100 not already activated -- the part of that park. Now we're coming from their houses, the phones are ringing. You know, it said time now, move to the armory, that sort of thing.

And then, B, the activated forces that were already propositioned on their own
didn't represent, quote, any kind of numbers. General McConville echoed the statement, quote, as I watched this thing, people are going wild. You know, the Guard was late, or they were this or this. We're going to -- do you think 34 people when there's 2,000 police officers, you know, on the Capitol, 8,000 police officers and 2,000 marshals. But for some reason this 34 -- I think he's referring specifically only to the QRF -- 34 personnel side mechanics was going to turn the tide on what was happening, end quote.

What's your feeling as to the numbers that you didn't have prepositioned -- you know, 40 here, 118 out at the traffic control points, the people at the armory -- whether those pockets were significant enough to have effected the outcome to have really helped in the moment?

A  Okay. It would have made a difference. And I think, when I was there on January 6th, and to see State police from out of town, one State police car, I think one person can make a difference. I saw transit police cars. If you know anything about transit, they're by themselves. So people were coming to help. And I believe 100, 150, 200, 250 would have made a difference, especially when you understand the dynamics of civil unrest and civil disturbance and how to manage a crowd, push a crowd slowly. Just the presence of the National Guard, I think, would have made a difference. I mean, well-trained, highly disciplined, well-organized, practiced and rehearsed as recently as the summer, would have made a difference.

But what you hear is people who don't have experience in civil unrest and civil disturbance. I mean, I have tremendous respect for my Active Duty fellow officers, but they have not been involved in civil unrest or civil disturbance. Sometimes just your presence will turn people around.

Q  Lieutenant Colonel Hunter told us that, you know, there was a decision, he
said, in consultation with sort of the D.C. Police, to keep the first shift handling traffic
control out of their posts in case they were needed for remission by D.C. out in the city,
you know, relying only on the QRF and the second shift at the armory and whomever
else, of course, had come to the armory, to respond to the Capitol. And so those traffic
control post servicemembers ended up manning their traffic control posts for 20 hours
straight. They didn't respond to the Capitol that night.

Can you talk to us about that decision, if you're aware of it, that decision that kept
them out their post and didn't ultimately have them come to the Capitol that night?

A  At the traffic control points?

Q  That's what Lieutenant Colonel Hunter told us, yes. The decision was made
to keep them out there. And we were -- I think that was corroborated also by Captain
Tarp, who is leading the sort of second shift, that when they arrived at the -- when they
went from the armory to the Capitol, wasn't the traffic control point members who went
back to the armory; they stayed out their posts.

A  So my order, my direction was, when the police leave, collapse together with
a policeman there. I wanted no one on the street without a police officer. So I'm
hearing that that might not have been followed.

Q  Okay.

A  But I absolutely gave that direction to not have guardsmen out there where
there were no police officers.

Q  I see.

A  So my direction was for everybody to collapse and then come together.

And I was fairly certain that Colonel Hunter, on his own initiative, which I would have
appreciated, would have taken -- had those soldiers be ready to report to the Capitol. I
was not aware that anybody, that Captain Tarp or anybody thought that there were
traffic control points to be manned.

Q  Okay. To remain out the posts?

A  Right.

Q  So I asked if it were possible that the sort of, you know, failures, I guess, on January 6th, the delay, was in part or in whole because sort of the left hand, the Department of Defense, and its ideas of the planning and what was required in order to go into battle, and the D.C. Guard in its readiness, that's the right hand, the D.C. Guard in its readiness for civil disturbance response both in terms of over the summer, their equipment, the fact that all these logistical plans had been put in place -- that the left hand and the right hand weren't coordinating.

And this is what Secretary McCarthy said. He said it could be. He acknowledged that a lot of things were probably missed. It was tremendously confusing, and that makes for a messy response.

What do you think of that assessment, that for whatever reasons and for whatever blame there may be on whichever persons for not communicating with one another, that that ultimately is what contributed to the delay, that, you know, Department of Defense was doing one thing, D.C. Guard was doing another, and had they only known what each other was doing, maybe there could have been a better understanding and a shortening of the delay?

A  So I think there was a reluctance to do the mission, and I think that started when the Mayor sent the sent the request in. I don't think the Army really wanted to do it, even through the traffic control in the Metro. And there was a lot of concern about how close we were to the Capitol. And I think that was their motivation, it was not to have any guardsmen at that Capitol.

Q  And so I wanted to get your reaction, you know, down the line. Although
everyone, of course, admits there was that hesitancy, right, there was that concern of having the troops near the Capitol in the lead-up to January 6th -- they all reject that, once an emergency happened, that any of the delay was attributable to a desire not to go. And that, ultimately, it was about the level of risk that, you know, leaders within the Army and the D.C. Guard were willing to wager, you know, the end. And, potentially, was -- I think there's a point that could be arguable that maybe their level of risk was -- they made it too high. That they required all of this thinking through and potentially, you know, waiting to see certain things happen that was incorrectly assessed. But that that was ultimately why there was a delay, not of intentional hesitancy once the emergency broke out.

General Milley put it this way, I've got to separate preparation from response. So they agreed hesitancy in the preparation, but they say different in the response.

What do you say to that? Why do you think that that's untrue, and that even after the emergency broke out, they were still actively intentionally hesitant to deploy the National Guard?

A You know, I don't know where the decision paralysis came from, but it clearly was there. The decision paralysis, decision avoidance. Why not pick up the phone and call me? I work for you. Mr. Secretary, call the commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard. Find out what am I prepared to do. We never had that call.

And I cannot help but separate -- I think about in the summer when they constantly were calling me, and the very next morning they were all in my office. And they stayed there day after day after day. Now, you've got -- you know, everybody knew what was going to happen. Now it's decision time. They made the decision what they gave me in paper. Now you see the Capitol is being breached. You don't -- the
Secretary of the Army doesn't call me. The Secretary of Defense doesn't call me. I'm trying to get through to the Secretary of the Army, and I'm unsuccessful.

So I -- only thing I can attribute that to is decision avoidance, or decision paralysis, or not wanting to do it.

Q And so when we asked you, you know, we asked you what was happening in the 3 hours and 19 minutes when you were at the VTC, your answer was delay. That's really all that, you know, you felt was happening in that moment.

And so I want to make sure that I understand your position. Do you believe the delay was intentional? Or when you say decision paralysis, could it have been as they've described, cautious -- they're being cautious because of, you know, the desire not to have troops go into a dangerous situation without planning? You know, again, whether -- putting aside the wisdom of that choice, do you accept that as the actual accurate reason why there was maybe that decision paralysis?

A I don't think they were concerned about putting soldiers -- when you say at risk, it was a civil disturbance mission which we trained for, which we're prepared to do, which we are equipped to do. We had the civil unrest, civil disturbance, civil disobedience equipment. We were practiced over the summer. We would fall in with the police, just like we did when the parks were vandalized. We supported the United States Park Police. We supported the Uniform Division of the Secret Service. We supported the Metropolitan Police. So we knew how to do that. We would fall in with the Capitol Police and restore order.

Q So can you tell us, maybe, what you think it was then? You know, there are obviously a lot of theories out there about the differences between the summer and January 6th. Some people talk about the composition of -- or even the politics. The politics, the composition, racial composition of the protesters. There's a lot of theories
as to why there may have been a reluctance.

Can you -- a twirl is one of them, that can be a distinction between the summer and January 6th. President Trump and the things that he was saying in the background about, you know, how ready he was to, in his mind, to deploy the military, how much he enjoyed deploying the military -- or preferred use of the military, excuse me -- and his obvious apparent vocal intention to have people in positions of power to halt the certification of the election. That's one theory, right, that that's upon people's minds and that's maybe contributing to this decision process.

What's your theory, if you could give it to us, as to why?

A    Well, theory or my thoughts?

Q    Your thoughts. Yeah, what you believe or known to have happened, but the motivation behind it.

A    So I'm African American. Child of the sixties. I think it would have been a vastly different response if those were African Americans trying to breach the Capitol. As a career law enforcement officer, part-time soldier, last 5 years full time, but a law enforcement officer my entire career, the law enforcement response would have been different.

You're looking at somebody who would get stopped by the police for driving a high-value government vehicle. No other reason. I think it would have been a different response. I've had to talk with my five children, and getting ready to have it with my granddaughter, the talk. I don't know if you know what I mean by the talk --

Q    Yes, sir.

A    -- of what to do to survive an encounter with the police.

So I think it would have been a different -- as a human being, as an African American, I think it would have been a different response by law enforcement on
January 6th. And I'll let you fill that in, but I just know it would have been a different response. I know that from experience.

Q Yeah. No, I appreciate that. And that's exactly the right place to finish. We've heard a lot about the differences between the summer, the lean forward response of the Guard, DOD, law enforcement, and military working closely together from the January 6th response, which was much different.

You said yourself that they didn't want to do the mission. And our big question is why. Race is one possible explanation. Protesters in the summer were largely, you know, racial justice advocates. It was in the wake of a murder of an African-American man by police. And the perception of the danger that causes may have been, in retrospect, overstated.

Whereas, on January 6th, largely Trump -- pro-Trump crowd, the perception of danger also inaccurate, but was -- they were not perceived as much as dangerous.

It sounds like you're agreeing with that theory, that part of the motivation for not wanting to do the mission might have a racial animus or difference in evaluation of danger of the crowd.

A So I think they just didn't want to do it. And I think that because I read that. I read that --

Q Yeah.

A -- that there were leaked memos that said the Army didn't want to do it.

Q Uh-huh. And the question is why?

A And that, I don't -- I can't comment on. What I commented on was that I think the response would have been different, a lot more heavy-handed --

Q Yeah.
A -- response to -- I think there would have been a lot more bloodshed.
You know, as a law enforcement officer, there were -- I saw enough to where I would have probably been using deadly force. People coming at me trying to take my weapon -- I almost always had two when I was a law enforcement officer -- I think it would have been more bloodshed --
Q Yeah.
A -- if the composition would have been different.
Q Well, my question is whether you think that --
A If the Army -- I don't know if the Army -- if that was a fact bearing on the Army's decision --
Q Yeah.
A -- or not, I don't know. All I do know is that the Army seemed very reluctant to support the mission.
Q Yeah. And I'm asking you why you think, based on your conversations, based on your interaction, and your having lived through two very different approaches, what is your perspective as to why they were reluctant? Is it this race issue? Is it something different? Is it --
A I don't know if it was race why the Army didn't want to come out or if they really thought it was -- I don't know if they thought it was a political thing. If, you know, if they were -- because what -- I looked and saw that there were guardsmen at the Capitol after 9/11. There were guardsmen at the Capitol in 1968 doing the riots after Dr. King.
Q Uh-huh.
A You can Google guardsmen, military, at the United States Capitol. They've been there. I really don't know if race was -- I don't think race was part of the military's decision paralysis.
Q: Okay.
A: I don't know why, but I don't think it was race.
Q: Okay. Uh-huh.
A: When I talk about race, I think the physical response --
Q: Yeah.
A: -- to the protesters would have been --
Q: I see.
A: -- different --
Q: Okay.
A: -- yeah, from law enforcement.
Q: Yeah. [redacted] read through a couple of other possible explanations. One is that it's in the midst of election activity, and there's a reluctance to insert the military into anything that is election related.

Do you think -- and, again, I'm admittedly asking you to speculate, but based on your vast experience and your interaction with these decisionmakers on January 6th, whether that was part of the motivation for the reluctance?
A: I really don't know. I really don't know why -- I remember asking the leadership on the VTC, I said, can't you see what's going on?
Q: Uh-huh.
A: Can't you see what's happening to the Capitol? And then when the shot rang out, I remember Chief Sund saying, hey, I just got a report a shot fired. Now, we found out later that was a Capitol Police officer. But somebody on the VTC said, oh, that's alleged. That's -- I mean, so they just did not want to do it.
Q: Yeah. And the other --
A: The motivation's known really only to them.
Q  Yeah. No, I understand.

The other possible explanation is criticism of a heavy-handed response in the
summer. In other words, the helicopter's flying low, you've got, you know, guards,
troops, an indistinguishable sort of for military, providing a heavy-handed response
prompts a softer response on January 6th. Did you hear talk like that or that -- might
that be --

A  I heard that after the fact. I heard that -- that's convenient. So everybody
knows that no one from the National Guard abused anybody.

Q  Right.

A  That is not in dispute. It's also not in dispute that the helicopter came too
low.

Q  Uh-huh.

A  The Army cleared those helicopter pilots. They were absolutely cleared.

Q  Yeah.

A  So you can't say -- now, I personally think they came too close. But it was
taken from me, that investigation was taken from me. And, ultimately, the Department
of the Army decided that those pilots were okay.

Q  Yeah.

A  But nobody can say that a guardsmen abused anybody, hurt anybody.

Those were police officers with uniforms that appeared to be U.S. military. D.C.
guardsmen --

Q  Yeah.

A  -- the city flag.

Q  Yeah, I totally understand. And I don't know that -- that that criticism is
necessarily based on fact or appropriately directed at the Guard. My question's
whether the perception that the response generally to the summer protests was
heavy-handed, informed the reluctance to have guardsmen or a similarly -- a perception
of a similarly heavy-handed response at the Capitol?

A    So, sir, I never received anything from the Secretary of the Army, the
Secretary of Defense, Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, not one
word that said that the District of Columbia National Guard was heavy-handed in their
approach. The only thing I heard was that the helicopters were too low. Everybody
could see that. And then we get an investigation. Some of the best aviators in the
Army came, conducted the investigation, and cleared those guardsmen.

Q    Uh-huh.

A    So this heavy-handedness is convenient after the fact. And when they say
heavy-handed, what beyond the helicopters were heavy-handed?

Q    Yeah. Again --

A    And nobody, nobody -- I didn't get any letters of admonishment. None of
my people received a letter of reprimand or what's called a GOMOR, General Officer
Memorandum for Record. Nobody got that.

Q    Yeah. And the predicate of the question is more perception than reality.

Was there a sense out there or somehow in the city, in the public, that, hey, they were
really heavy and militaristic in the summer, and we have to be careful that we are not
walking into that same criticism, however unjustified it might have been, with respect to
January 6th? Might that have been part of the experience --

A    I don't believe so, sir. I think what people said was law enforcement was
heavy-handed, especially when they cleared the area for the President to come through.

Q    Yeah.

A    I mean, everybody who saw that, those were police officers brought in from
out of State, deputized, and they cleared it.

Q  Okay.

A  I mean, I don't know if you saw that on TV.

Q  Oh, yeah.

A  They clearly cleared it, and they clearly were not guardsmen.

Q  When you talked about reluctance to do the mission, who specifically, in your view, was reluctant?  Sounds like you’re saying the DOD, that the generals, the Secretary of the Army, General Platt, General -- they were reluctant.  But was Chief Sund reluctant?  Was Mayor Bowser reluctant?

A  No, no.

Q  Were others reluctant?

A  No.  Mayor Bowser, as she typically does, she requested District of Columbia National Guard.  And during my time as the commanding general, we honored her request.  Every single one.  She requested D.C. guardsmen.  She requested us for COVID.  Whatever she asked us to do, we did.  And I was able to write the mission analysis, and the Secretary of the Army approved it.

Q  Okay.  So you didn't sense any reluctance in her?

A  None.

Q  Okay.

A  I mean, she was the -- she had the foresight to ask for the D.C. Guard.  We got this big event.  You know, we expect an August protest.  We got hotels at capacity.  We have buses coming into the city, I need the D.C. Guard.

Could I ask you to react to something she said, Mayor Bowser, on this point about whether there was a perception?  Again, whether it's true or not, she says, quote, I had no issue with the Guard being on the fence in front of Lafayette Square.
But in terms of the Guard trying to move people from protests areas, no. The D.C. Guard, we did not call on the D.C. Guard to do that. We never called in the D.C. Guard to fly helicopters over the city. I think that the President used not just the National Guard, but he used guards from other places, the D.C. National Guard, other guards, other parts of the Army, other parts of our normal, regional infrastructure to make a national point.

And that was over the summer. And then in terms of whether that led to constraints that we’re talking about, her position is, quote, I assumed that they wanted a tighter rein -- this is DOD -- on what the Guard did for that reason because they had been, I think, badly embarrassed by the events of the previous year.
[5:00 p.m.]

General Walker.  Hmm.  Yeah, I really can't comment on that, other than, talking to the Mayor, she never was able to discern -- she used to say, out-of-State -- what did she call it -- she used to say, foreign guard.  She said, "I don't want these foreign guardsmen in my city."  And I remember telling her and her staff, I said, "You can't have foreign guardsmen.  They're not foreign.  They're Americans."

The problem that the Mayor had, in talking to her, is that you could not distinguish some of the guardsmen outside of the D.C. Guard, because guardsmen came, I wanted to say, from 10 different States to support the summer.

And so, if you saw me on the left side and you saw a patch that I wear, or wore, you might think I was an Active Duty soldier, but it's really my service in Afghanistan.  If you saw the right side, it was the District of Columbia Capital Guardian patch.

And what happened, she -- people saw these patches and said, this is the Active Duty Army.  But there were other Federal law enforcement that had the military uniforms indistinguishable from the Guard.  And I know that bothered the Mayor, because she didn't know who was in her city.  And, you know, that was --

BY [REDACTED]

Q  But I think that's precisely what we're talking about.  It's those incidents that even rose to the level of having Secretary Esper put out that there shouldn't be insignia that is transferred to law enforcement or to anyone else.  That was passed in the NDAA as a rule that went out prior to January 6th, as you're aware of.

So I understand the D.C. National Guard was not found at fault for anything during the summer.  But all these little data points of what occurred, did that inform what was happening at DOD?
A: It could. It could. I understand what you’re saying. And Dr. Esper was right, and they did work to -- it could’ve been confusing to people, who was doing what.
Q: Right.
A: But not for the D.C. Guard, because of the flags.
I guess it was leaked that the Army didn’t want to -- that’s where I heard about it. I mean, I didn’t know until after the fact that the Army did not want to do even the Mayor’s request. They didn’t want anybody around that Capitol. And that’s known only to them, why they didn’t want us around the Capitol.
I mean, we went back and forth: Hey, nope, this is too close. Move that -- you’re not going to support that traffic control point. You’re not going to be at this Metro stop. It’s too close to the Capitol. I don’t want anybody in a military uniform close to the Capitol.

BY [DELETED]:
Q: And did they say why?
A: They didn’t like the way it looked.
Q: Did they say why they didn’t like the way it looked?
A: Not to me.
Q: Okay.
A: We didn’t like the way this looks.
Q: And, again, was that because it was an election? Because it --
A: Yeah, that was my conclusion, that it was a -- the U.S. military -- because, at the end of the day, the uniform says U.S. Army --
Q: Exactly.
Q: Yes.
A So they didn't -- what I was told is that the military wasn't going to be seen as interfering.

Q With an election-related joint session of Congress where the election is being certified?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And so that was not just your speculation, but someone said that, that we don't want guardsmen near the Capitol --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- because it's election-related and the military has to stay --

A Yes.

Q Okay. All right. I appreciate that.

[Redacted] So I just have one final thing I wanted to ask you. I don't know if [Redacted] has also?

[Redacted] I just had one thing.

[Redacted] Go ahead.

[Redacted]:

Q In the two rallies before, the November 12th and December 14th, was the National Guard on standby for those events?

A No. I asked, should we be. I asked the Secretary, and he said no. I asked the Metropolitan Police, would they need us; they said no. I asked the Park Police; no. Capitol Police; no.

Q In a prior interview, Secretary McCarthy did believe that they were on standby.

A No. Standby, but not, you know -- I probably had people -- we always had people that I can pick up the phone and call. But there was nobody in the Armory.
There was nobody sitting in the Armory waiting to go.

Q  Okay.

A  I had people at the FBI headquarters, I had people at different places, but there was nobody ready to -- because I didn't have a request from anyone.

Q  Got it.  But, so that could still be perceived as standby?

A  So the National Guard's always -- we are always -- if something were to happen now, there's a -- who can get here in 2 hours?  Who can get here in 4 hours?  Who can get here in 6?  We always have that.

Q  Got it.  Okay.

Q  And before we conclude, I just wanted to ask, because I got you on the record about Lieutenant Colonel Hunter's estimate that the Guard could've arrived about an hour and a half earlier than they did, but I know you've publicly said that you believe that the earliest they could've gone -- you could've had them out there in 20 minutes, I think, is -- I've heard you say that before.

A  Oh, from the Armory.  Yeah, I --

Q  Okay.

A  -- could've had them from the Armory --

Q  I see.

A  -- in 20 minutes.  I mean, in traffic, 20 minutes.  I mean, the Armory's right down the street.

Q  Okay.

A  In 20 minutes.

Q  So you agree, maybe, like, 3:40, 3:50, which is where you had it.  Not earlier than that, you wouldn't say.
A: Could’ve had some people there earlier.

Q: Okay.

A: We could've. We could've.

Q: Okay.

A: Yeah, I mean, I could've took everybody that was in the Armory and sent them down there --

Q: Right.

A: -- in about 20 minutes, yeah. The folks that were there. You know, any given day, there's anywhere between 75 -- usually 75 up to maybe 100 guardsmen in the Armory doing their normal duties. So I could've pulled all of them.

Q: But does that timing include any of the, you know, designating a rally point, linking up with law enforcement, finding out who was the person that they were going to link up with, the law enforcement --

A: Colonel Hunter already had that done.

Q: Right.

A: Yeah.

Q: But he puts it at -- earliest for him, he thinks it's -- for any, you know, for these groups that he has, it's 3:40, 3:50. He didn't believe that there was another grouping that he could send earlier than that. That's the earliest that he could send them, is his estimation.

A: I think we could've got people there earlier.

Q: Okay.

A: Yeah. I do. But I trust what Colonel Hunter was doing. I mean, he's a man of tremendous insight, vision. But I personally think we could've got people earlier, you know. We could've -- and when Chief Sund called me and when I called the Army...
and the Army said "go," my plan then would've been to bring the guardsmen that were
working in the Armory, "Hey, sign out the gear, get on the buses, get down there."
Q I see. And so you're really thinking from the moment that Chief Sund even
makes the, you know --
A The call.
Q -- the call --
A And then the Secretary would've said, "Okay," then I just would've got
everybody going.
Q Okay.
A All right. Thank you so much.
Q But I don't want to conflict with Hunter. I mean, he did a lot of tremendous
work there. I mean, on his own, he left the traffic control point, went right to the
Capitol, and started planning -- I mean, just what I'd expect him to do.
Q Great.
A We thank you so much for coming back a second time and
spending this time and even more time than we had allotted. We are so very
appreciative.
General Walker Well, you're very welcome. I mean, the truth matters. I
mean, I hope this -- what you're doing is important. It's very, very important. I mean,
you all have other jobs. I think I was told that, right? Didn't you come here to
do -- aren't you --
A We left them. We left our previous jobs.
A We left those. This is our only job for now.
A This is now our job, but yeah.
General Walker Oh, okay. I don't know why I thought that --
Some of us will go back to them, because some of us are detailed out, but --

General Walker. Yeah, that’s what I thought.

-- us both, no, we’re not going to --

We’re actually unemployed after this.

After this, yeah, we need to find jobs again, but --

General Walker. That’s even more important.

You’re right.

General Walker. I mean, that just shows the level of commitment.

Oh, you don’t need all this on the --

We can go off the record.

Just for the record, the transcribed interview stands in recess, subject to the call of the chair.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 5:09 p.m., the interview was recessed, subject to the call of the chair.]
Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

I have read the foregoing ____ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

__________________________
Witness Name

__________________________
Date